

S269471

No. _____

In the Supreme Court of the State of California

STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA!, ET AL.

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL.

Defendants and Respondents;

NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO INDIANS,

Intervenor and Respondent.

Fifth Appellate District, Case No. F069302
Madera County Superior Court, Case No. MCV062850
Hon. Michael J. Jurkovich, Judge

PETITION FOR REVIEW

ROB BONTA (SBN 202668)

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN (SBN 250374)

Solicitor General

SARA J. DRAKE (SBN 102565)

Senior Assistant Attorney General

*JOSHUA PATASHNIK (SBN 295120)

Deputy Solicitor General

TIMOTHY M. MUSCAT (SBN 148944)

Deputy Attorney General

455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000

San Francisco, CA 94102-7004

Telephone: (415) 510-3896

Fax: (415) 703-2552

Josh.Patashnik@doj.ca.gov

*Attorneys for Defendants and
Respondents State of California et al.*

June 22, 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Issues Presented	7
Introduction.....	8
Legal Background	10
A. Federal law.....	10
B. California law.....	12
Statement of the Case	14
A. Factual background	14
B. Procedural history	16
Reasons for Granting Review.....	18
I. Review is warranted to determine whether State Executive Branch actions may be subject to the referendum power.....	19
A. The court of appeal’s decision contravenes the text of the California Constitution and longstanding judicial precedent.....	19
B. The court of appeal’s decision threatens to create uncertainty and subject an array of Executive Branch actions to the referendum power	24
II. Review is warranted to determine whether Proposition 48 implicitly annulled the Governor’s concurrence	26
Conclusion	32

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

	Page
CASES	
<i>Am. Canyon Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Napa</i> (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 100	25
<i>Am. Fedn. of Labor v. Eu</i> (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687	19, 22, 26
<i>Assembly v. Deukmejian</i> (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638	20
<i>Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore</i> (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582	23
<i>City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey</i> (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1068.....	20, 27, 31
<i>DeVita v. County of Napa</i> (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763.....	20, 22, 23, 25
<i>Empire Waste Mgmt. v. Town of Windsor</i> (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 714.....	20
<i>Home Builders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Counties, Inc. v. City of Lemoore</i> (2010) 185 Cal.App.5th 554.....	25
<i>Hopping v. City of Richmond</i> (1915) 170 Cal. 605	20, 22
<i>Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Amador Water Agency</i> (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 279.....	21
<i>Hunt v. Mayor & City Council of Riverside</i> (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619	20
<i>Marine Forests Society v. Cal. Coastal Com.</i> (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1.....	24

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)

	Page
<i>Referendum Com. v. City of Hermosa Beach</i> (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 152	26, 27
<i>Rubalcava v. Martinez</i> (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 563	20
<i>Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino</i> (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220	20, 26, 27
<i>Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette</i> (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 657	27
<i>Stand Up for California! v. State</i> (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686	16
<i>Stand Up for California! v. State</i> (2020) 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 200	16
<i>Stand Up for California! v. State</i> (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 197	7
<i>Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of Interior</i> (9th Cir. 2020) 959 F.3d 1154	15
<i>United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria</i> <i>v. Newsom</i> (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538	<i>passim</i>
<i>Whitmore v. Carr</i> (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 590	27
<i>Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir</i> (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105	19, 25
<i>Worthington v. City Council of Rohnert Park</i> (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1132	22
<i>Yesson v. S.F. Municipal Transp. Agency</i> (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 108	21

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)

	Page
<i>Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer</i> (1952) 343 U.S. 579.....	14
 STATUTES	
18 U.S.C.	
§ 1166.....	10
§ 1168.....	10
25 U.S.C.	
§ 2701.....	10
§ 2703(6)	11
§ 2703(7)	11
§ 2703(8)	11
§ 2710.....	11
§ 2710(d)(1)(B).....	10, 11
§ 2710(d)(3)(A).....	11
§ 2710(d)(7)(A)(i)	11
§ 2710(d)(7)(B).....	11
§ 2719(a)	11
§ 2719(b)(1)(A).....	7, 11, 12, 14
 Elec. Code, § 9050	 29
 Stats. 2013, ch. 51	 15
 Wat. Code Appendix, § 95-7.3	 21
 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS	
Cal. Const.	
Article ii, § 8, subd. (a).....	23
Article ii, § 9	7
Article ii, § 9, subd. (a).....	9, 19, 21, 22
Article ii, § 9, subd. (b).....	21, 22, 31
 REGULATIONS	
25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3)	10

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
(continued)

Page

COURT RULES

California Rules of Court

 Rule 8.500(e)(1)7

 Rule 8.1125(a)7

OTHER AUTHORITIES

California General Election, Official Voter Information

 Guide (Nov. 4, 2014 election) 27, 28, 30, 31

Zasloff, *Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California's*

Separation of Powers (2004) 51 UCLA L.Rev. 1079 24, 25

The State of California, the Governor, the Attorney General, the Gambling Control Commission, and the Bureau of Gambling Control respectfully file this petition for review of the published decision of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, in *Stand Up for California! v. State* (May 13, 2021, F069302) 64 Cal.App.5th 197 [278 Cal.Rptr.3d 627]. A copy of the slip opinion (“Opn.”) is attached here as Exhibit A. This petition for review is timely. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.500(e)(1).)¹

ISSUES PRESENTED

Federal law establishes a cooperative federalism scheme governing casino-style gaming on Indian lands. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act provides that gaming may occur on certain newly acquired Indian land if the U.S. Secretary of the Interior determines that it is appropriate to take land into trust for that purpose and the Governor of the State where the land is located concurs in that determination. (See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) In *United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom* (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538, 564, this Court held that California law empowers the Governor to concur in that type of determination, though “the Legislature may restrict or eliminate” that power. The issues presented are:

1. Is the Governor’s concurrence in a determination by the U.S. Secretary of the Interior that it is appropriate to take land into trust for tribal gaming (see 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A)) subject to the referendum power (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 9)?

¹ The state defendants will submit a separate request for depublication. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.1125(a).)

2. Did Proposition 48, a 2014 referendum that rejected a statute ratifying compacts between the State and two Indian tribes, also implicitly annul the Governor’s 2012 concurrence in the Secretary’s determination regarding the land those compacts addressed?

INTRODUCTION

In *United Auburn*, this Court held that “current California law permits the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming on Indian land taken into trust for an Indian tribe.” (10 Cal.5th at p. 564.) The Court explained that “the Legislature may restrict or eliminate the Governor’s implicit power to concur,” but observed that “lawmakers haven’t done so yet.” (*Id.* at pp. 564, 565.)

In this case, before this Court’s decision in *United Auburn*, the Fifth District Court of Appeal held that the Governor lacked the power to concur. After *United Auburn* abrogated that holding, this Court transferred this case back to the court of appeal for further consideration. Now, notwithstanding *United Auburn*, the court of appeal has again invalidated the Governor’s 2012 concurrence with respect to land in Madera County. The court reached that result in a surprising way: It held that Proposition 48—a 2014 referendum in which the electorate rejected the statute ratifying the tribal-state compacts pertaining to the proposed Madera County casino at issue in this case—also “impliedly . . . annul[led]” the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s determination as to that land. (Opn. 23.)

That analysis is severely flawed. It conflicts with the plain text of the California Constitution, longstanding judicial precedent, and *United Auburn* itself. If left undisturbed, the decision below threatens to create substantial practical problems both for courts and for the other branches of state government.

First, although the referendum power allows the electorate to “approve or reject” only “statutes or parts of statutes” (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 9, subd. (a)), the court of appeal held that the Governor’s concurrence is also subject to the referendum power because it has a “legislative aspect” (Opn. 19). That reasoning contravenes longstanding precedent directing that, at the state level, only statutes enacted by the Legislature are subject to referendum. The decision below could potentially subject a wide variety of State Executive Branch actions—such as agency regulations, executive orders, and budgetary authority—to the referendum power for the first time.

Second, although Proposition 48 rejected a compact-ratification statute and said nothing about the Governor’s separate concurrence power, the court of appeal held that the referendum nonetheless implicitly annulled the Governor’s concurrence, based on the court’s “consideration of the consequences” of limiting the referendum’s reach “to the compact itself.” (Opn. 22.) That analysis conflicts with well-established precedent that makes clear that the only effect of a referendum is to reject the challenged statute and return to the pre-enactment status quo—no more, no less. Under that status quo, *United Auburn* explains, the Governor has the power to concur, a power

he exercised with respect to the Interior Secretary's determination here. Just as that concurrence would have remained in effect had the Legislature refused to ratify the related compact in the first place, neither did the voters' rejection of the compact-ratification statute implicitly annul the Governor's concurrence. The court of appeal's contrary conclusion is untenable and would invite extensive, novel litigation regarding the implied effects of referenda on other provisions of state law.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. Federal law

The U.S. Secretary of the Interior may take land into trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe if she “determines that the acquisition of the land is necessary to facilitate tribal self-determination, economic development, or Indian housing.” (25 C.F.R. § 151.3(a)(3).) In 1988, Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), which establishes a regulatory structure for Indian gaming and specifies the circumstances under which casino-style gaming may occur on lands that have been taken into trust by the Secretary for the benefit of an Indian tribe. (See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168; 25 U.S.C. § 2701.)

IGRA divides Indian gaming into three “classes.” Federally recognized tribes may conduct casino-style gaming, referred to as “class III” gaming, only in “a State that permits such gaming for any purpose by any person, organization, or entity.” (25 U.S.C.

§ 2710(d)(1)(B); see *id.* § 2703(6)-(8).² If a Tribe wishes to engage in class III gaming in a State that permits it, the Tribe must “request the State . . . to enter into negotiations for the purpose of entering into a Tribal-State compact” authorizing and governing the class III gaming. (*Id.* § 2710(d)(3)(A).) Upon receiving such a request, a State must “negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact.” (*Ibid.*) If a State refuses to enter negotiations or to negotiate in good faith, the Tribe may sue in federal court. (*Id.* § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i).) The court may order mediation; if that mediation fails, the Interior Secretary “shall prescribe . . . procedures” (referred to as “secretarial procedures”) that will function in place of a duly negotiated compact. (*Id.* § 2710(d)(7)(B).)

IGRA generally prohibits casino-style gaming on Indian lands acquired by the Secretary in trust for the benefit of an Indian tribe after 1988. (See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2710, 2719(a).) But the statute carves out several exceptions, including—relevant here—an exception allowing gaming on newly acquired Indian lands if the Secretary, after consulting with local officials and nearby tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on those lands “[1] would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and [2] would not be detrimental to the surrounding

² “Class I” gaming means traditional forms of tribal gaming and social games for minimal prizes. (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6).) “Class II” gaming includes bingo games meeting certain criteria and some card games. (*Id.* § 2703(7).) “Class III” gaming is defined to include all forms of gaming that are not in class I or class II. (*Id.* § 2703(8).)

community.” (*Id.* § 2719(b)(1)(A).) This is often referred to as a “two-part determination.” But this exception is only available “if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in” the Secretary’s two-part determination. (*Ibid.*) IGRA does not itself purport to give governors the authority to concur in the Secretary’s determination; whether a governor has the authority to concur is a question of state law. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 548.)

B. California law

In *United Auburn*, this Court considered whether the Governor has the authority to concur in the Secretary’s determination to take land into trust for operation of class III gaming. The Court “h[e]ld that California law empowers the Governor to concur.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 543.) Although no constitutional or statutory provision expressly confers that power, none precludes it either, and the Court explained that a variety of factors led to the conclusion that the Governor inherently and implicitly possesses that power, subject to limitation by the Legislature.

The voters’ enactment in 2000 of Proposition 1A “provide[d] the starting point for” the analysis. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 550.) Proposition 1A “amended the Constitution to give the Governor authority ‘to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of’” class III tribal gaming in California. (*Id.* at pp. 549-550.) This Court reasoned that while “the power to negotiate compacts with Indian tribes does not, by itself, imply the power to concur,”

neither does “Proposition 1A’s failure to expressly mention the power to concur” preclude the possibility that the Governor might possess that power “inherent[ly].” (*Id.* at p. 554.) And Proposition 1A’s explicit conferral on the Governor of “the power to negotiate compacts for class III gaming” on Indian lands “is consistent with the Governor exercising his inherent power to concur to allow class III gaming to occur on those lands.” (*Ibid.*)

The Court identified other factors that supported the conclusion that the Governor possesses the implied power to concur in the Secretary’s determination. “[T]he Governor has historically been tasked with concurring—or declining to concur—under a variety of federal statutes,” a power “the Governor has exercised . . . throughout our state’s history.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 559-560.) “The concurrence power is also consistent with the governor’s historic role as the state’s representative,” encompassing the power “to communicate directly with, and represent the state to, the federal executive branch.” (*Id.* at p. 561.) And “in the years since Proposition 1A was enacted, [the] Legislature has not—in contrast to the lawmaking bodies of other states—exercised its authority to enact legislation limiting the Governor’s power to concur.” (*Id.* at p. 563, citation omitted).

Thus, “[i]n the absence of an express grant or denial of authority,” the Court held that “the Governor’s concurrence falls within a ‘zone of twilight in which he and the Legislature may have concurrent authority’ and where legislative ‘inertia, indifference or quiescence’ invites the exercise of executive

power.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 563, quoting *Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer* (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 637 [conc. opn. of Jackson, J.]) “That power, however, isn’t an infeasible one”; rather, “the Legislature may restrict or eliminate” it. (*Id.* at pp. 563-564.) But because “the Legislature has enacted no such law . . . the power to concur remains in the Governor’s hands.” (*Id.* at p. 565.)

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Factual background

The North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians is a federally recognized Indian tribe that “possesses a small rancheria in the Sierra Nevada foothills” in Madera County northeast of Fresno. (Opn. 4.) In March 2005, North Fork requested that the Secretary take into trust a 305-acre parcel “on State Route 99 adjacent to the City of Madera, about 40 miles west of the rancheria,” where North Fork proposes to build a hotel and casino with class III gaming. (*Ibid.*) In September 2011, the Secretary made the required two-part determination that taking the land into trust for gaming purposes “would be in the best interest of North Fork and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community.” (*Ibid.*, citing 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) In August 2012, Governor Brown concurred in that determination. (*Ibid.*) In February 2013, the Secretary accepted a deed conveying the parcel to the federal government in trust. (Opn. 5.)

The Governor and North Fork “negotiated a tribal-state compact” governing the operation of the casino, as provided for under IGRA and California law under Proposition 1A. (Opn. 5.)

The compact, executed in August 2012 alongside a related compact between the State and the Wiyot Tribe, set forth “detailed regulations for the operation of [the] casino” and also required North Fork to share revenue from the casino with the Wiyot Tribe “in order to enable that tribe to forgo gaming on its environmentally sensitive land.” (Opn. 6.) The Legislature ratified the compacts by statute in July 2013. (*Ibid.*; see Stats. 2013, ch. 51.)

Shortly thereafter, an organization called Stand Up for California!, which is a plaintiff in this litigation, submitted paperwork to begin gathering signatures in support of a “proposed statewide referendum rejecting the compact ratification statute.” (Opn. 7.) The referendum qualified for the November 4, 2014 general election ballot, where it was designated Proposition 48. (Opn. 8.) Approximately 61 percent of voters voted “No” on Proposition 48, “thereby rejecting the ratification statute.” (*Ibid.*)

In the wake of that rejection, the State declined to negotiate a new compact with North Fork, which then filed a federal lawsuit seeking “to compel the state to negotiate a new compact in good faith.” (Opn. 8.) In accordance with IGRA (see *ante*, pp. 10-12), after mandatory mediation failed to produce a new compact, the Interior Secretary approved “secretarial procedures” that “authoriz[ed] class III gaming on the 305-acre site in the absence of a state-approved compact.” (Opn. 9.) In November 2016, Stand Up and other plaintiffs challenged those secretarial procedures in federal court under the Administrative Procedure

Act and federal environmental laws. (*Ibid.*) The district court and the Ninth Circuit rejected the APA claim, but certain environmental claims remain pending. (*Ibid.*; see *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of Interior* (9th Cir. 2020) 959 F.3d 1154, 1156-1157.)

B. Procedural history

In March 2013—after the Governor’s concurrence in the Secretary’s two-part determination with respect to the Madera County site but before the Legislature’s ratification of the compact and the voters’ subsequent referendum—the plaintiffs in this case filed a petition for writ of mandate asserting that “the Governor had no authority to concur” in the Secretary’s determination. (Opn. 6.) The trial court rejected that argument and sustained demurrers filed by the State and by North Fork. (Opn. 7-8.) The Fifth District Court of Appeal reversed, “concluding that, in the circumstances presented, the Governor lacked the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination.” (Opn. 9; see *Stand Up for California! v. State* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686, 705.) This Court granted review and transferred the case back to the court of appeal for reconsideration in light of *United Auburn*. (*Stand Up for California! v. State* (2020) 269 Cal.Rptr.3d 200 (mem.))

After supplemental briefing, the court of appeal again reversed the trial court’s judgment of dismissal, concluding that in addition to repealing the compact-ratification statute, Proposition 48 had also “impliedly revok[ed]” the Governor’s “concurrence for the Madera site.” (Opn. 2; see *id.* at p. 23.) The

court noted that *United Auburn* had specified that the concurrence power is not “indefeasible,” and therefore could be “avoided or undone” by the Legislature or the people, including retroactively. (Opn. 16-17.)

The court then rejected the argument, advanced by the State and by North Fork, that annulment of a concurrence may not be achieved by referendum because “legislation is required to limit the concurrence power” and “a referendum does not enact legislation,” but rather rejects a statute *already enacted* by the Legislature. (Opn. 18.) In the court’s view, this theory, “rooted in concepts of ‘executive’ authority and ‘legislative’ acts,” was unpersuasive “in view of the Supreme Court’s use of a flexible, nonformalistic approach” in *United Auburn*. (*Ibid.*; see *United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 559 [the concurrence power is not “a wholly legislative or executive one” but rather “contain[s] features that cut across both categories”].) The court of appeal held that “[t]he legislative aspect of a concurrence renders it subject to the power of referendum.” (*Id.* at p. 19.)

Having concluded that a gubernatorial concurrence could be subject to a referendum, the court then determined that Proposition 48 was such a referendum. The court acknowledged that “[t]he official title and summary for Proposition 48 . . . do not expressly reference the concurrence power or the Governor’s concurrence for the Madera site.” (Opn. 20.) But the court concluded that the lack of an express reference was not dispositive. Because the concurrence power is “implicit,” “by parity of reasoning, that which the people granted by implication

can be annulled by implication.” (Opn. 21.) And, in the court’s view, Proposition 48 had implicitly annulled the Governor’s concurrence with respect to the Madera County site.

The court identified two factors supporting that conclusion. First, “[w]hile not decisive, the fact that the official title and summary” of Proposition 48 had been “prepared by the Attorney General’s Office, which is representing the state defendants, supports applying the general principle that reasonabl[e] doubts should be resolved in favor of the use of the referendum power.” (Opn. 21-22.) And second, the court’s “analysis of the voter[s]’ intent in rejecting Proposition 48 also includes the consideration of the consequences that flow from the competing interpretations of Proposition 48.” (Opn. 22.) In the court’s view, the referendum was best “interpreted as an expression of [the voters]’ intent to reject class III gaming on the 305-acre Madera site,” which “implies the voters disapproved the Governor’s concurrence.” (Opn. 23.)

REASONS FOR GRANTING REVIEW

The court of appeal held in this case that an Executive Branch action—the Governor’s concurrence—is subject to the referendum power, and that Proposition 48 implicitly annulled the Governor’s 2012 concurrence regarding the Madera County site. Both those holdings merit further review. They depart from longstanding principles of California law in a manner that could create substantial difficulties for the courts and the other branches of state government.

I. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER STATE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ACTIONS MAY BE SUBJECT TO THE REFERENDUM POWER

The court of appeal held that the Governor’s concurrence in the Secretary’s two-part determination is subject to the referendum power because it involves a “legislative aspect.” (Opn. 19; see *id.* at pp. 17-20.) That conclusion cannot be squared either with the text of the State Constitution or with decades of case law. It also has the potential for troubling and far-reaching practical consequences.

A. The court of appeal’s decision contravenes the text of the California Constitution and longstanding judicial precedent

The referendum power “is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes,” with exceptions (not relevant here) for certain kinds of statutes. (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 9, subd. (a).) It “allows voters to weigh in on laws that have already been passed by their elected representatives.” (*Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir* (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1111.) If referendum proponents gather the requisite number of signatures to “place a legislative enactment on the ballot for an up or down vote,” the “referendum suspends operation of the law until it is approved by a majority of voters.” (*Ibid.*)

The court of appeal’s decision transgresses a bright-line rule that appears to have been uniformly followed until now: A referendum may review only “statutes” enacted by “a legislative body”—which at the state level means a bill “passed by the Legislature.” (*Am. Fedn. of Labor v. Eu* (1984) 36 Cal.3d 687, 707-708.) As this Court explained just a few years after the

initiative and referendum powers were established in 1911, the referendum power “applies only to” actions of a “legislative body” that are “exercises of its legislative power.” (*Hopping v. City of Richmond* (1915) 170 Cal. 605, 609-610.) In the decades since then, dozens of cases have reaffirmed that basic principle.³ While it is somewhat less clear-cut what types of *local* government actions are subject to the referendum power under that standard, at the state level, the fundamental “nature of a referendum” is that “voters are asked to approve” or reject a “bill which the Legislature has enacted.” (*Assembly v. Deukmejian* (1982) 30 Cal.3d 638, 656, capitalization omitted; accord, e.g., *City of Morgan Hill v. Bushey* (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1068, 1082 (*Bushey*) [referendum power may be used “to reject a statute enacted by the Legislature”]; *Santa Clara County Local Transp. Auth. v. Guardino* (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 241 (*Guardino*) [referendum power applies to “a statute *enacted* by a bill *passed* by the Legislature,” italics in original].)⁴

³ See, e.g., *Hunt v. Mayor & City Council of Riverside* (1948) 31 Cal.2d 619, 621 [describing the referendum power as “a restriction upon the legislative powers exercised by the state legislature and by the legislative bodies of counties and cities”]; *Empire Waste Mgmt. v. Town of Windsor* (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 714, 717 [“any legislative decision made by a representative body is subject to referendum”]; *Rubalcava v. Martinez* (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 563, 569 [referendum power allows voters “to approve or reject measures passed by a legislative body”].

⁴ At the local level, the referendum power generally extends to “legislative decisions of a city council or board of supervisors.” (*DeVita v. County of Napa* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 763, 775.) The

The decision below contravenes that precedent. So far as the state defendants are aware, it is the first published appellate decision in California holding that an action of the State Executive Branch is subject to the referendum power. This Court’s review is warranted for that reason alone.

None of the rationales articulated by the court of appeal for departing from that precedent withstands scrutiny. The court “interpret[ed] the Constitution’s phrase ‘statutes or parts of statutes’ as referring to legislative actions.” (Opn. 19.) It noted that the Governor’s “concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination . . . is not wholly legislative or executive, but cuts across both categories.” (*Ibid.*, citing *United Auburn*, *supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 599.) In the court’s view, “[t]he legislative aspect of a concurrence renders it subject to the power of referendum.” (*Ibid.*) In other words, the court of appeal rested its holding on the theory that a State Executive Branch action is subject to the referendum power so long as it has a “legislative aspect.” (*Ibid.*)

That theory cannot be squared with the Constitution’s plain text, which refers only to actual “statutes” that have been

Legislature has also extended the referendum power to review the legislative actions of certain other kinds of elected representative bodies, such as some water agencies. (See, e.g., *Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Assn. v. Amador Water Agency* (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 279, 283, citing Wat. Code App., § 95-7.3.) And in the rare circumstance where an unelected local governmental body has the power to “enact measures that override previous City ordinances,” such actions may constitute “legislative” acts subject to referendum. (*Yesson v. S.F. Municipal Transp. Agency* (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 108, 120.)

“enact[ed],” (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 9, subd. (a)-(b)), not all government actions with “legislative aspects.” Nor does it find any support in precedent. Courts have held that some actions of legislative bodies are *not* subject to the referendum power because they are not truly “legislative” in nature. For example, a nonbinding “resolution” that “merely expresses the wishes of the enacting body” is not subject to referendum, because it is not a “statute.” (*Am. Fedn. of Labor, supra*, 36 Cal.3d at p. 708.) Similarly, at the local level, where “executive powers are frequently committed to” legislative bodies like city councils (*Hopping, supra*, 170 Cal. at p. 610), courts have distinguished between a legislative body’s “legislative acts, which are subject to initiative and referendum, and its administrative or executive acts, which are not” (*DeVita, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 776).⁵ But those authorities provide no basis for the court of appeal’s holding that State Executive Branch actions with some “legislative aspect” *are* subject to the referendum power. The court improperly conflated Executive Branch functions that are partly legislative in nature—of which there are many under California’s governmental structure (see *post*, pp. 24-25)—with statutes enacted by the Legislature. The referendum power extends only to the latter, not the former.

⁵ In general, a power “is legislative in its nature if it prescribes a new policy or plan; whereas, it is administrative in its nature if it merely pursues a plan already adopted by the legislative body itself.” (*Worthington v. City Council of Rohnert Park* (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1140-1141.)

The court of appeal also invoked the “principle that reasonable doubts about the referendum power should be resolved in favor of its use.” (Opn. 19, citing *Associated Home Builders v. City of Livermore* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591.) That presumption has no place here, where the constitutional text and case law are clear. In addition, the presumption applies only to “legislative decisions” of the Legislature or “a city council or board of supervisors” or similar legislative body—not to Executive Branch actions. (*DeVita, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 775.)

Moreover, the policy concern upon which the “presumption rests,” namely that “all power of government ultimately resides in the people” (*DeVita, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 775), is inapposite here. In light of this Court’s guidance that “lawmakers” are “free to restrict or eliminate the Governor’s authority to concur” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 565), there is no question that the concurrence power is subject to limitation (at least prospectively) by initiative, which “is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them” (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 8, subd. (a)).⁶ But that does not provide any basis for the court of appeal’s conclusion that a concurrence may be annulled by a *referendum*

⁶ It is unclear what the effect would be, under federal law, of a state statute purporting to restrict the Governor’s concurrence power *retroactively* so as to annul or rescind a prior concurrence that was valid at the time it was given. That question—which the Court need not address in this case—is distinct from the one the Court resolved in *United Auburn* when it held that, as a matter of state law, the Legislature or the electorate may modify the Governor’s power to concur.

rejecting an enacted statute on a different (if related) subject, as opposed to an initiative enacting a new statute limiting the concurrence power. On the contrary, this Court’s recognition that a new statute would be needed to alter the concurrence power (see *United Auburn, supra*, at pp. 564-565) forecloses the court of appeal’s theory. (See *post*, pp. 26-27.)

B. The court of appeal’s decision threatens to create uncertainty and subject an array of Executive Branch actions to the referendum power

The court of appeal’s holding that “[t]he legislative aspect of a concurrence renders it subject to the power of referendum” (Opn. 19) could have far-reaching and unpredictable effects if it were to remain the law. The California Constitution reflects “a flexible, nonformalist understanding of separation of powers in which the functions of the offices are fluid.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 558, quoting Zasloff, *Taking Politics Seriously: A Theory of California’s Separation of Powers* (2004) 51 UCLA L.Rev. 1079, 1106.) Under that structure, there are a wide variety of State Executive Branch actions that could be deemed to have “legislative aspects” and thus could be subject to the referendum power under the court of appeal’s theory.

For instance, many “modern administrative agencies established by the Legislature” are “authorized . . . to perform” functions described as “quasi-legislative,” such as when an agency “engages in rulemaking through the adoption of regulations.” (*Marine Forests Society v. Cal. Coastal Com.* (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1, 25.) A government entity’s imposition of fees or distribution of funds may also qualify as “quasi-legislative.” (See

Home Builders Assn. of Tulare/Kings Counties, Inc. v. City of Lemoore (2010) 185 Cal.App.5th 554, 561; *Am. Canyon Fire Protection Dist. v. County of Napa* (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 100, 106.) And certain budgetary functions the Constitution assigns to the Governor are “quintessentially ‘legislative’” in nature. (Zasloff, *supra*, 51 UCLA L.Rev. at pp. 1110-1111.)

Under the court of appeal’s approach, many of these legislative or quasi-legislative actions may wind up subject to the referendum power. The court’s conflation of Executive Branch functions that have a “legislative aspect”—in the sense that they are ultimately subject to the control of the Legislature—with actual statutes enacted by the Legislature would appear to significantly expand the reach of the referendum power.

That would present serious practical challenges for multiple branches of state government. It would create uncertainty for the Executive Branch, suggesting that agency regulations or other government actions might be subject to the referendum process—including the rule that when a referendum petition gathers the requisite number of signatures, it immediately “suspends operation of the law until it is approved by a majority of voters.” (*Wilde, supra*, 9 Cal.5th at p. 1111.) The decision below also threatens to enmesh state courts in recurring disputes regarding what kinds of state Executive Branch actions are subject to the referendum power. Those disputes arise frequently regarding local government actions (see, e.g., *DeVita, supra*, 9 Cal.4th at p. 776), but have been uncommon at the state level—thanks to the bright-line rule limiting the reach of the

referendum power to “statutes . . . enacted by the Legislature” (*Am. Fedn. of Labor, supra*, 36 Cal.3d at p. 708).

II. REVIEW IS WARRANTED TO DETERMINE WHETHER PROPOSITION 48 IMPLICITLY ANNULLED THE GOVERNOR’S CONCURRENCE

In addition to holding that a Governor’s concurrence is subject to referendum, the court of appeal also determined that Proposition 48 “impliedly expressed [the voters’] will to annul the Governor’s . . . concurrence for the Madera site.” (Opn. 23; see *id.* at pp. 20-23.) That conclusion conflicts with both this Court’s decision in *United Auburn* and the basic principle that a referendum does not enact new law, but rather rejects a statute enacted by a legislative body. It also could invite extensive future litigation regarding the “implied” reach of other referenda beyond the particular statutes they address.

In *United Auburn*, this Court held that “current California law permits the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s” two-part determination. (10 Cal.5th at p. 564.) The “Legislature may restrict or eliminate the Governor’s implicit power to concur,” but some new “state law” would be necessary to “creat[e] such a limitation.” (*Ibid.*) The Court repeated: “Although lawmakers haven’t done so yet, they remain free to restrict or eliminate the Governor’s authority to concur. That the Legislature has enacted no such law means the power to concur remains in the Governor’s hands.” (*Id.* at p. 565.)

In the court of appeal’s view, Proposition 48 effected such a change in the law. But “[r]eferenda do not enact law.” (*Guardino, supra*, 11 Cal.4th at p. 242, quoting *Referendum Com.*

v. City of Hermosa Beach (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 152, 157; accord *Whitmore v. Carr* (1934) 2 Cal.App.2d 590, 593 [“Enactment [of law] is not a quality of the referendum.”].) Rather, a “referendum is limited in its operation to the adoption or rejection of legislation *already enacted by a legislative body.*” (*Guardino, supra*, at p. 241, italics in original.) Thus, “a referendum does not work a change in” the law; it either approves such a change already enacted by the Legislature (if the referendum passes) or “prevents such a change from occurring” (if the referendum fails). (*Bushey, supra*, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1082.) In other words, “[a] referendum that rejects” legislation “simply maintains the status quo”—i.e., the state of affairs had the Legislature itself voted down the statute in the first place. (*Save Lafayette v. City of Lafayette* (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 657, 666.)

The decision below cannot be squared with these authorities. The voters’ rejection in Proposition 48 of the North Fork and Wiyot compacts restored the status quo, as if the statute ratifying those compacts had never been enacted. The status quo Proposition 48 returned to was the same as if the Legislature itself had rejected ratification of the compact in July 2013: The August 2012 gubernatorial concurrence remained in place, but there was no ratified compact. The result would have been either further negotiations regarding a compact or, potentially, the implementation of “secretarial procedures” under federal law in lieu of a compact. (See *ante*, p. 11.)

Consistent with these principles, the ballot materials for Proposition 48 informed voters that “[a] ‘Yes’ vote approves, and a

‘No’ vote rejects, a statute that” “[r]atifies tribal gaming compacts between the state and the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians and the Wiyot Tribe.” (California General Election, Official Voter Information Guide (Nov. 4, 2014 election), p. 40 (Voter Information Guide).)⁷ The ballot materials did not mention the Governor’s concurrence from the year before or suggest that it too would be affected by the referendum. And for good reason: the Governor’s concurrence is separate and distinct from a tribal-state compact.⁸

The court of appeal nonetheless held that Proposition 48 implicitly annulled the Governor’s concurrence retroactively, but its rationale is not persuasive. The court first posited that because the Governor’s concurrence power is implicit, “by parity of reasoning, that which the people granted by implication can be annulled by implication.” (Opn. 21.) But even if a duly enacted statute could limit the Governor’s concurrence power by implication, it does not follow that a referendum *rejecting* a statute—thus restoring the status quo and *preventing* any change in the law—may do so.

⁷ Available at <https://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2014/general/en/pdf/complete-vigr1.pdf>.

⁸ Cf. *United Auburn*, *supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 554 [“the power to negotiate compacts with Indian tribes does not, by itself, imply the power to concur”]; *id.* at p. 576 [dis. opn. of Cantil-Sakauye, C.J.] [“The Governor’s involvement with a compact is of a qualitatively different nature from his concurrence,” internal quotation marks omitted].

Next, in the court of appeal's view, "the fact [that] the official title and summary" of Proposition 48 were "prepared by the Attorney General's Office, which is representing the state defendants, supports applying the general principle that reasonabl[e] doubts should be resolved in favor of the use of the referendum power." (Opn. 21-22.) But that presumption has no application here (see *ante*, pp. 23-24), and the Attorney General's statutorily assigned role of providing a ballot title and summary (Elec. Code, § 9050) is not a basis for concluding otherwise. The court of appeal should have evaluated the arguments presented by the parties on their merits; its analysis of the effects of Proposition 48 should not have been influenced by the fact that the Attorney General both prepared the ballot summary and "is representing the state defendants." (Opn. 21.) The court did not cite any precedent or offer any persuasive explanation for discounting the interpretation of Proposition 48 offered by the state defendants based on the identity of their counsel.

Finally, the court of appeal based its ruling on its "consideration of the consequences that flow from the competing interpretations of Proposition 48." (Opn. 22.) In the court's view, "[r]estricting the voter[s]' rejection of the compact-ratifying statute to the compact itself is the equivalent of inferring the voter[s] intended to approve the Governor's concurrence," which would have the consequence that "class III gaming would be permitted to occur on the Madera site," but "would be governed by secretarial procedures" rather than "by the terms of the compact." (*Ibid.*) The court considered it unlikely that this

outcome would “accurately identify[] the people’s will.” (*Ibid.*) “In comparison, the voter[s]’ rejection” in Proposition 48 “of the compact-ratifying statute is reasonably interpreted as an expression of their intent to reject class III gaming on the 305-acre Madera site,” which “implies the voters disapproved the Governor’s concurrence.” (Opn. 23.)

That approach is both methodologically flawed and mistaken even on its own terms. There is no need for a court to analyze “the voter[s]’ intent in rejecting” a referendum (Opn. 22); the statute in question simply fails to take effect, just as if the Legislature had voted down the bill. (*Ante*, pp. 26-27.) In any event, the court’s speculation that the voters must have intended either to reject class III gaming at the Madera County site entirely or to “approve the Governor’s concurrence” (Opn. 22-23) is unfounded. There is no indication that the voters intended either to approve or disapprove the Governor’s concurrence—not least because the ballot materials did not mention it. On the contrary, the ballot materials expressly contemplated a third option. The voters were told that, if the compact-ratification statute were rejected, then “a new compact” could be negotiated to govern class III gaming at the Madera County site. (Voter Information Guide, *supra*, at p. 42.)⁹ While that did not

⁹ The Legislative Analyst explained: “If this proposition is rejected by voters, North Fork would not be able to move forward with the construction and operation of a new casino unless a new compact was approved by the state and federal governments. Wiyot would be free to negotiate a new compact with the state for

ultimately happen, the ballot materials' recognition of the possibility of a new compact is incompatible with the court of appeal's theory that the voters implicitly annulled the Governor's concurrence, which would have removed a prerequisite for *any* class III gaming to occur and thus made it pointless for the parties to negotiate any new compact regarding the site.

The court of appeal's approach would also present significant practical problems. Under the court's theory, "a successful referendum" would not be "merely the rejection of [a statute] before it takes effect." (*Bushey, supra*, 5 Cal.5th at p. 1081.) Rather, courts would "consider what intent is logically implied by" the referendum to determine what other, pre-existing Executive Branch actions the voters may have "impliedly expressed their will to annul." (Opn. 22-23.) That could open the door to lawsuits regarding the implied effects of referenda on separate but potentially related provisions of law. And unlike a referendum itself, which must be presented to the Secretary of State "within 90 days after the enactment date of the statute" (Cal. Const., art. ii, § 9, subd. (b)), there would apparently be no such time limit with respect to the *implied* effects of a

gaming activities on its tribal lands." (Voter Information Guide, *supra*, at p. 42; see also *id.* at p. 8 ["A NO vote on this measure means: The state's compacts with North Fork and Wiyot would not go into effect. As a result, neither tribe could begin gaming unless new compacts were approved by the state and federal governments."].)

referendum, as this case illustrates.¹⁰ A referendum might be deemed to have implicitly invalidated government actions or regulations that are many years old. That could occur even where the voters considering the referendum have no idea that their choices at the ballot box might have such far-reaching effects—just as the voters in 2014 were never informed that Proposition 48 could affect the Governor’s 2012 concurrence regarding the Madera County site.

CONCLUSION

The petition for review should be granted.

¹⁰ Here, the Governor issued his concurrence on August 30, 2012, but the referendum petition for Proposition 48 was not submitted to the Secretary of State until October 2013—90 days after the Legislature enacted the compact-ratification statute, but well over a year after the Governor’s concurrence. (Opn. 6-7.) As noted above (*ante*, p. 23, fn. 6), it remains unclear what effect (if any) a State’s attempt to retroactively withdraw a Governor’s previously valid concurrence may have as a matter of federal law.

Respectfully submitted,

ROB BONTA

Attorney General of California

MICHAEL J. MONGAN

Solicitor General

SARA J. DRAKE

Senior Assistant Attorney General

/s/ Joshua Patashnik

JOSHUA PATASHNIK

Deputy Solicitor General

TIMOTHY M. MUSCAT

Deputy Attorney General

*Attorneys for Defendant and Respondent
State of California*

June 22, 2021

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I certify that the attached Petition for Review uses a 13-point Century Schoolbook font and contains 6,545 words.

ROB BONTA

Attorney General of California

/s/ Joshua Patashnik

JOSHUA PATASHNIK

Deputy Solicitor General

Attorneys for Defendants and

Respondents State of California et al.

June 22, 2021

Exhibit A

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA! et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA et al.,

Defendants and Respondents;

NORTH FORK RANCHERIA OF MONO
INDIANS,

Intervener and Respondent.

F069302

(Super. Ct. No. MCV062850)

OPINION

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Michael J. Jurkovich, Judge.

Snell & Wilmer, Sean M. Sherlock, Todd E. Lundell, and Jing Hua, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Sara J. Drake, William P. Torngren, and Timothy M. Muscat, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents.

Maier Pfeffer Kim Geary & Cohen, John A. Maier; Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, Danielle Spinelli and Christopher E. Babbitt, for Intervener and Respondent.

Plaintiffs Stand Up for California! and Barbara Leach (plaintiffs) brought this lawsuit to challenge the Governor’s authority to concur in the decision of the United States Secretary of the Interior (Interior Secretary) to take 305 acres of land in Madera County into trust for North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians (North Fork) for the purpose of operating a casino. The trial court sustained demurrers by North Fork and the state defendants— the State of California, the Governor, the Attorney General, the California Gambling Control Commission, and the Bureau of Gambling Control. In 2016, we reversed the judgment of dismissal, concluding the Governor lacked the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary’s determination to take the Madera site into trust. (*Stand Up for California! v. State of California* (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 686, 705.) The California Supreme Court granted review and held this case pending its decision in *United Auburn Indian Community of Auburn Rancheria v. Newsom* (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538 (*United Auburn*).

After deciding California law empowers the Governor to concur, the Supreme Court transferred this case back to us with directions to vacate our decision and reconsider the matter in light of *United Auburn*. We conclude the facts of this case are distinguishable from those in *United Auburn* because at the November 2014 general election California voters rejected the Legislature’s ratification of the tribal-state compact for gaming at the Madera site. As described below, we conclude the people retained the power to annul a concurrence by the Governor and the voters exercised this retained power at the 2014 election by impliedly revoking the concurrence for the Madera site. As a result, the concurrence is no longer valid, and the demurrer should have been overruled.

We therefore reverse the judgment of dismissal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Federal Statutes

The history of federal and state regulation of gaming on Indian lands is set forth in *United Auburn* and need not be repeated in detail here. (See *United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 544-547.) Two federal statutes relevant to this litigation are the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA; 25 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq.) and the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1167; 25 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq.). IRA authorizes the Interior Secretary to acquire land and hold it in trust to provide land for Indians. (*Carciari v. Salazar* (2009) 555 U.S. 379, 381-382; 25 U.S.C. § 5108.) IGRA provides “a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes as a means of promoting tribal economic development, self-sufficiency, and strong tribal governments.” (25 U.S.C. § 2702(1).) Class III gaming—the type of gambling practiced in casinos in Nevada (25 U.S.C. § 2703(6)-(8))—is lawful on Indian lands when certain statutory conditions have been met. (See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d).) Additional conditions apply when, like the 305 acres in Madera County, the land was taken into trust after October 17, 1988. (See 25 U.S.C. § 2719; 25 C.F.R. § 292 (2008) [“Gaming on Trust Lands Acquired After October 17, 1988”].) One of those conditions—the Governor’s concurrence—is the subject of this litigation.

The statutory text imposing this condition provides that land taken into trust after October 17, 1988, may be used for gaming if “the [Interior] Secretary, after consultation with the Indian tribe and appropriate State and local officials, including officials of other nearby Indian tribes, determines that a gaming establishment on newly acquired lands would be in the best interest of the Indian tribe and its members, and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community, *but only if the Governor of the State in which the gaming activity is to be conducted concurs in the [Interior] Secretary’s determination.*” (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A), italics added.) For purposes of this opinion,

we refer to the Interior Secretary's determination under this IGRA provision as the two-part determination. IGRA does not grant the Governor the authority to concur—that authority must come from state law. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 548-549, fn. 4.)

North Fork's Proposed Casino

North Fork is a federally recognized Indian tribe with about 1,900 tribal citizens. It possesses a small rancheria in the Sierra Nevada foothills near the unincorporated community of North Fork. In March 2005, North Fork submitted a formal fee-to-trust application to the Bureau of Indian Affairs, requesting the United States Department of the Interior (DOI) take into trust for North Fork's benefit a 305-acre parcel in Madera County. The parcel is located on State Route 99 adjacent to the City of Madera, about 40 miles west of the rancheria. North Fork proposes building a hotel and casino with class III gaming on the site.

At the time of the fee-to-trust application, the parcel was owned by a subsidiary of North Fork's development partner. That entity, Nevada-based Station Casinos, LLC, is partially owned by Red Rock Resorts, Inc., a publicly traded company. Plaintiffs alleged North Fork and Station Casinos signed a casino management contract that gives Station Casinos the right to operate the casino and receive 24 percent of its net income.

In September 2011, the Interior Secretary made a two-part determination on North Fork's proposed casino, finding that taking the land into trust for the purpose of gaming would be in the best interest of North Fork and would not be detrimental to the surrounding community. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) By letter dated August 30, 2012, the Governor concurred in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination. The Governor's letter expressed a reluctance to allow the expansion of gaming on land currently ineligible for it, but concurred "in this case because of several exceptional

circumstances.” The Governor’s concurrence fulfilled a condition set forth in IGRA. (25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).)

In November 2012, the Interior Secretary, having made his two-part determination and obtained the Governor’s concurrence, issued a decision approving North Fork’s fee-to-trust application for the 305-acre parcel. This decision was implemented in February 2013, when a grant deed conveying the 305 acres to the federal government in trust was executed by North Fork’s development partner, accepted by the Interior Secretary, and recorded in the County of Madera.¹

While the Governor was evaluating whether to concur in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination, he and North Fork negotiated a tribal-state compact under Government Code section 12012.25 and article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), of the California Constitution. Under IGRA, a tribal-state compact is one of the methods of legalizing class III gaming on Indian land. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C).) Such compacts address many issues, including the scope of the games, standards for operating the games, regulatory responsibility, allocation of criminal and civil jurisdiction, liquor sales, and taxes on retail and restaurant outlets. (25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(3)(C).)

The tribal-state compact negotiated by the Governor and North Fork authorized North Fork to conduct class III gaming on the 305-acre parcel. In exchange, North Fork agreed not to conduct gaming on its environmentally sensitive rancheria or elsewhere in California; agreed to make payments to the Chukchansi Tribe to mitigate the economic impact of the new casino on the existing Chukchansi casino; agreed to share revenue with

¹ The validity of this fee-to-trust decision was challenged in a federal lawsuit. (See *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior* (D.D.C. 2016) 204 F.Supp.3d 212, affirmed 879 F.3d 1177.) The District of Columbia Circuit concluded the decision to take the land into trust for North Fork “was reasonable and consistent with applicable law” and affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of DOI. (*Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior* (D.C. Cir. 2018) 879 F.3d 1177, 1192.)

the Wiyot Tribe in order to enable that tribe to forgo gaming on its environmentally sensitive land near Humboldt Bay National Wildlife Refuge; agreed to participate in a revenue-sharing scheme to benefit other tribes without casinos; and submitted to detailed regulations for the operation of its casino.

The Governor and North Fork executed the compact on August 31, 2012, the day after the Governor signed his concurrence letter. Under California's Constitution, such compacts are "subject to ratification by the Legislature." (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 19, subd. (f).) Accordingly, the Governor forwarded the compact to the Legislature for its approval.

This Lawsuit

In March 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging the Governor violated the California Constitution when he concurred in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination. As amended, the complaint named as defendants the State of California, the Governor, the Attorney General, the Gambling Control Commission, and the Bureau of Gambling Control. The complaint alleged the Governor had no authority to concur and prayed for a writ of mandate setting aside the concurrence.

While the lawsuit was pending, both houses of the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 277, which added section 12012.59 to the Government Code. Subdivision (a)(1) of the new section stated: "The tribal-state gaming compact entered into in accordance with the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act [citations] between the State of California and the North Fork Rancheria Band of Mono Indians, executed on August 31, 2012, is hereby ratified." Subdivision (b) of the new section provided that, in deference to tribal sovereignty, certain actions were not subject to the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). The Governor signed it on July 3, 2013, and it became chapter 51 of the Statutes of 2013. The ratified compact was forwarded to the Interior Secretary, who published a notice in the Federal Register, stating that the

compact was approved and was taking effect to the extent it was consistent with IGRA. (78 Fed.Reg. 62649 (Oct. 22, 2013).)

In July 2013, Cheryl Schmit, using the letterhead of Stand Up for California!, asked the Attorney General for a title and summary for a proposed statewide referendum rejecting the compact ratification statute, chapter 51 of the Statutes of 2013. The Attorney General issued an official title and summary for the measure that stated:

“REFERENDUM TO OVERTURN INDIAN GAMING COMPACTS. If signed by the required number of registered voters and timely filed with the Secretary of State, this petition will place on the statewide ballot a challenge to a state law previously approved by the Legislature and the Governor. The law must then be approved by a majority of voters at the next statewide election to go into effect. The law ratifies two gaming compacts (with the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, and the Wiyot Tribe); and it exempts execution of the compacts, certain projects, and intergovernmental agreements from the California Environmental Quality Act. (13-0007.)”

The proponents of the petition had until October 1, 2013, to submit voter signatures in support of the petition to county election officials.

In August 2013, North Fork, which was not originally a party to the litigation initiated by plaintiffs’ complaint, was granted leave to intervene. North Fork filed a cross-complaint, seeking a declaratory judgment stating the referendum petition was invalid. The cross-complaint and its subsequent dismissal are not material to the resolution of this appeal.

North Fork and the state defendants demurred to plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged the Governor’s concurrence was unauthorized. In March 2014, the trial court sustained the demurrers. In its written ruling, the court stated that the Governor’s power to concur arose by implication from his authority to negotiate and execute tribal-state compacts, as set forth in article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), of the California Constitution. Because the Governor was authorized to negotiate compacts for gaming on Indian land, and some such compacts, including the one at issue in this case, cannot come

into effect unless the land in question is taken into trust by the federal government with the Governor's concurrence, the Governor must have the power to concur. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that when the voters added article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), to the California Constitution via Proposition 1A in 2000, they intended to deny to the state the authority to approve Indian casinos on land that was not Indian land at the time, so that there could be no casinos on newly added trust land. Plaintiffs conceded they could not cure their complaint by amendment, so the demurrers were sustained without leave to amend. A defense judgment was entered on March 12, 2014. Plaintiffs timely appealed.

Proposition 48

While this appeal was pending, the proponents of the referendum on the statute ratifying the compacts obtained a sufficient number of valid petition signatures to qualify the referendum for the November 4, 2014 general election ballot. The measure was designated Proposition 48 and submitted to the electorate. At the election, approximately 4.2 million Californians (61 percent) voted "No" on Proposition 48, thereby rejecting the ratification statute. (Historical and Statutory Notes, 32E pt. 1 West's Ann. Gov. Code (2016 supp.) foll. § 12012.59, p. 13.)

Federal Litigation

As a result of the voters' rejection of the tribal-state compact, the state refused to negotiate another compact with North Fork. In March 2015, North Fork filed an action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to compel the state to negotiate a new compact in good faith. (*Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior* (E.D.Cal. 2018) 328 F.Supp.3d 1051, 1056, affd. in part & revd. in part (9th Cir. 2020) 959 F.3d 1154.) In November 2015, the district court granted North Fork's request and ordered North Fork and the state to conclude a compact within 60 days. (*Id.* at p. 1057.) Pursuant to IGRA, the district court then sent the matter to mediation, which did

not produce a settlement. (*Ibid.*) In July 2016, the Interior Secretary approved a document called Secretarial Procedures for the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians (the secretarial procedures) for the purpose of authorizing class III gaming on the 305-acre site in the absence of a state-approved compact. (*Ibid.*) The secretarial procedures, which are 102 pages long (excluding the table of contents and appendices), contain detailed provisions governing how the gaming will be conducted and many other issues. A DOI letter dated July 29, 2016, notified North Fork that the secretarial procedures were in effect.

In November 2016, Stand Up for California! and others filed another lawsuit against DOI in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to challenge the secretarial procedures. (*Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra*, 959 F.3d at pp. 1157-1158.) The district court granted the DOI's motion for summary judgment. (*Id.* at p. 1158.) In May 2020, the Ninth Circuit determined the secretarial procedures complied with the federal Administrative Procedure Act. (*Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, supra*, at pp. 1156-1157, 1162.) However, the court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine whether the issuance of the secretarial procedures complied with federal environmental statutes. (*Id.* at p. 1166.)

This Appeal

In December 2016, this court issued an opinion concluding that, in the circumstances presented, the Governor lacked the authority to concur in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination. (*Stand Up for California! v. State of California, supra*, 6 Cal.App.5th at p. 705.) Each member of the panel adopted a different rationale to reach this conclusion.

The state and North Fork filed petitions for review. In March 2017, the California Supreme Court granted the petitions and deferred consideration pending the outcome of *United Auburn*.

On August 31, 2020, the California Supreme Court filed its decision in *United Auburn*, concluding “that California law empowers the Governor to concur.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 543.) A month and a half later, the Supreme Court transferred the present case back to this court “with directions to vacate its decision and reconsider the matter in light of *United Auburn v. Newsom* (2020) 10 Cal.5th 538. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.528(d).)” In accordance with these directions and the California Rules of Court, we allowed all parties to submit an opening brief followed by a brief addressing the points raised by their opponents.

DISCUSSION

I. United Auburn

Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s transfer order, our task is to determine whether the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination for the Madera site is valid. We start by describing the holding in *United Auburn* and the analysis the high court used to define the Governor’s concurrence power.

The Supreme Court held “that current California law permits the Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s determination to allow class III gaming on Indian land taken into trust for an Indian tribe after IGRA was enacted.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 564.) The concurrence upheld in *United Auburn* was set forth in a letter from the Governor dated August 30, 2012. (*Id.* at p. 547.) That date has significance in this case because the Governor’s concurrence letter addressing the Madera site also was dated August 30, 2012.

The Supreme Court stated its conclusion about the Governor’s concurrence authority was “supported by the Governor’s historical practice of concurring under a

variety of federal statutes, the legislatively enacted expectation that the Governor represent the state's interests in negotiations or proceedings involving the federal government, and the absence of any explicit constitutional or statutory limits on the Governor's power to concur in the Interior Secretary's determination under IGRA." (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 544.) The court described the foregoing as "markers of the legal terrain [that] help us map a zone of twilight between the powers of the Governor and the Legislature. But they also convey why legislative changes can, by bringing any implicit gubernatorial power to 'its lowest ebb' in this domain, restrict or eliminate the Governor's concurrence power. (*Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer* (1952) 343 U.S. 579, 637 (conc. opn. of Jackson, J.) (*Youngstown*)).) Because the Legislature has imposed no such restriction, however, we conclude the Governor acted lawfully when he concurred in the Interior Secretary's determination" relating to proposal for the Enterprise Rancheria of Maidu Indians. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 544.)

The Supreme Court discussed the relationship of Proposition 1A to the Governor's implicit power to concur. Proposition 1A added article IV, section 19, subdivision (f), to the California Constitution, which states in full:

"Notwithstanding subdivisions (a) and (e), and any other provision of state law, the Governor is authorized to negotiate and conclude compacts, subject to ratification by the Legislature, for the operation of slot machines and for the conduct of lottery games and banking and percentage card games by federally recognized Indian tribes on Indian lands in California in accordance with federal law. Accordingly, slot machines, lottery games, and banking and percentage card games are hereby permitted to be conducted and operated on tribal lands subject to those compacts."

The Supreme Court noted the parties' agreement that Proposition 1A provided the starting point for an analysis of the concurrence power. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 550.) Addressing the text of Proposition 1A, the court stated it did not expressly grant the Governor the power to concur. (*Ibid.*) The court also considered the reference to federal law and concluded it "does not, by itself, bestow the Governor with

the concurrence power.” (*Ibid.*) Next, the court concluded the absence of an express grant of concurrence authority did not resolve the question because “each branch of government possess certain inherent or implied powers.” (*Id.* at p. 551.) Consequently, the remainder of the court’s discussion addressed whether the Governor’s concurrence was an implicit power.

Proposition 1A expressly authorized the Governor to negotiate and conclude tribal-state compacts for gaming on Indian lands. Accordingly, the Supreme Court considered whether the express grant of authority to enter compacts impliedly granted the authority to concur. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 554.) The court concluded the power to negotiate compacts did not, by itself, imply the grant of an implied power to concur. (*Ibid.*) Nonetheless, the court determined the power to negotiate compacts was “consistent with the Governor exercising his inherent power to concur to allow class III gaming on” land taken into trust after IGRA was enacted. (*Ibid.*)

The Supreme Court examined the ballot materials for Proposition 1A, discussed inferences that could be drawn from those materials, and found no reason to conclude the Governor was barred from concurring in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 556.) Those materials do not address the specific questions of law raised in this appeal.

The court also addressed how separation of power concerns affected the Governor’s power to concur and included a historical analysis of the power to concur in other contexts. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 558-563.) Ultimately, the court concluded the Governor had the authority to concur and stated the concurrence authority was “consistent with his historic practice of concurring in a variety of cooperative-federalism schemes, and his role as the state’s representative under Government Code section 12012.” (*Id.* at p. 563.) As a result, the court found “it consistent with Proposition 1A and our separations of powers jurisprudence to conclude that, despite the

absence of specific legislative authorization, California law empowers the Governor to concur.” (*Ibid.*)

The last step of our overview of *United Auburn* describes some of the limitations on the Governor’s implicit power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination. The court stated the power to concur falls within a “ ‘zone of twilight’ ... where legislative ‘inertia, indifference or quiescence’ invites the exercise of executive power.” (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 563.) The court stated the Governor’s implicit concurrence power “isn’t an infeasible one” and the legislative branch may enact legislation reducing that power. (*Ibid.*) Specifically, “the Legislature may restrict or eliminate the Governor’s implicit power to concur.” (*Id.* at p. 564.) The court determined there was no state law creating such a limitation and, thus, the Governor had the power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination in that case. (*Ibid.*)

II. Role of Proposition 48

A. Contentions

Plaintiffs contend the Governor’s concurrence for the Madera site is invalid under the unique facts of this case. They argue the Governor’s inherent or implied power to concur is not an infeasible one and exists in a “zone of twilight” that is dependent upon legislative inaction. Plaintiffs assert no such inaction exists because voters exercised their legislative function in rejecting Proposition 48, the referendum seeking ratification of a tribal-state compact for North Fork’s proposed casino. Based on the outcome of the referendum, plaintiffs contend this case is easily distinguished from *United Auburn* because the state’s legislative apparatus was not indifferent to and did not acquiesce in the Governor’s exercise of an authority to concur in the proposed class III gaming at the Madera site.

The state contends the ratification or rejection of the tribal-state compact is irrelevant because the Governor’s concurrence power does not depend upon a valid

compact. Under the state's interpretation of Proposition 48, it addressed only the compact. It did not address the Governor's previous concurrence in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination for the Madera site or, more generally, the Governor's authority to concur. Thus, in the state's view, Proposition 48 cannot be interpreted as negating the Governor's exercise of the concurrence authority he clearly held on August 30, 2012. Summarizing its position, the state asserts: "No law limits the Governor's power to concur, and Proposition 48 did not create any such law."

North Fork contends the rationale that the Governor's implied power does not survive in a case where the voters have vetoed an exercise of the express power on which the implied power is based did not survive *United Auburn* because Proposition 48 was not a legislative action limiting the Governor's concurrence authority. North Fork argues there are multiple reasons why Proposition 48 cannot be treated as an implicit, retroactive restriction on the Governor's concurrence authority. North Fork starts with the Supreme Court's conclusion that "current California law permits the Governor's concurrence" (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 564) and its statement that "the Legislature has imposed no ... restriction" on the Governor's authority. (*Id.* at p. 544.) Next, North Fork argues Proposition 48 was not enacted by the Legislature, implying that only the Legislature, not the voters, has the ability to impose a restriction on the Governor's authority. North Fork also joins the state's textual argument and asserts Proposition 48 did not pertain to the concurrence authority and, thus, did not purport to restrict it. North Fork argues a voter referendum addressing a distinct, legislative act cannot impliedly, and retroactively, divest the Governor of the concurrence power the Supreme Court held he possesses.

B. The People’s Authority to Invalidate a Concurrence

The parties’ contentions raise a series of questions about the authority of the people to eliminate or invalidate a concurrence given by the Governor. *United Auburn* did not resolve these questions of constitutional law.

1. *Retroactive Annulment*

The first question is whether the Governor’s concurrence, once given, can be invalidated by subsequent action of the electorate. This question has a dual aspect involving the people’s authority and the timing of the exercise of that authority. North Fork described the timing aspect as “the troublesome retroactivity question.” North Fork did not explicitly address the aspect of the question involving the people’s authority. However, its argument that *United Auburn* envisioned an affirmative act by the Legislature to prospectively limit the Governor’s authority implies the people lack the authority to invalidate a concurrence already given.

The facts presented in *United Auburn* did not raise the question of the authority of the Legislature or the people to annul a concurrence given by the Governor. As a result, the Supreme Court did not decide the question or discuss it in dicta. (See *Masellis v. Law Office of Leslie F. Jensen* (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 1077, 1093 [our high court’s dicta usually are followed unless there is a compelling reason not to do so].) In particular, the court did not state a concurrence issued by the Governor could *never* be revoked or annulled by either the Legislature or California’s voters or, alternatively, a Governor’s concurrence was *always* subject to revocation or annulment by the Legislature or the people. Similarly, the court did not address a middle ground and identify the circumstances in which the Legislature or the people could, or could not, revoke a concurrence given by the Governor.

In the absence of express guidance from the Supreme Court, we turn to the California Constitution, which “is the fundamental and supreme law of this state as to all matters within its scope.” (*Dye v. Council of City of Compton* (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 486,

490 (*Dye*.) The foundation of our state government is the principle that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their protection, security, and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform it when the public good may require.” (Cal. Const., art. II, §1; see *McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court* (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1162, 1184 [our Constitution recognizes that in our democratic system all political power derives from the people].) The court in *Dye* provided an explanation of the constitutional term “political power” by stating “all governmental power, legislative or otherwise, is derived from the people.” (*Dye, supra*, at pp. 489-490.) Another constitutional provision defines the Governor’s authority: “The supreme executive power of this State is vested in the Governor. The Governor shall see that the law is faithfully executed.” (Cal. Const., art. V, § 1.) The relationship between the people and the Governor is defined in part by the people’s express authority to recall elective officers such as the Governor. (Cal. Const., art. II, §§ 13, 14.) Thus, under the California Constitution, the Governor is not an independent co-equal of the people. Any power the Governor possesses is derived from them.

These constitutional provisions are general in nature and do not provide a specific answer to the question of whether a concurrence, once given, can be revoked or annulled by the people. Consequently, with these constitutional principles in mind, we return to *United Auburn* and its description of the scope and nature of the Governor’s implicit power to concur in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination. As quoted earlier, the Supreme Court stated legislative changes could restrict or eliminate the Governor’s concurrence power. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 544.) The court also stated the concurrence power “isn’t an infeasible one.” (*Id.* at p. 563.) The court did not define what it meant by “infeasible.” As a result, we conclude the court used the word “infeasible” in its ordinary sense, rather than in an undisclosed, technical sense. “[T]o ascertain the ordinary, usual meaning of a word, courts appropriately refer to the

dictionary definition of that word.” (*Wasatch Property Management v. Degrate* (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1111, 1121-1122.)

The adjective “defeasible” means “capable of being or liable to being voided, annulled, or undone : subject to defeasance esp. by being cut off through the exercise of a power or the happening of an event.” (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993) p. 590.) The noun “defeasance” means defeat, overthrow, undoing or “rendering null or void.” (*Ibid.*) Accordingly, the adjective “indefeasible” is defined as “not capable of or not liable to being annulled or voided or undone.” (*Id.* at p. 1147.) These terms have the same meanings when used in a legal context. Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004) defines “defeasible” as “capable of being annulled or avoided” and “indefeasible” as “not vulnerable to being defeated, revoked, or lost.” (*Id.* at pp. 449, 783.)

Based on section 1 of article II of the California Constitution, our Supreme Court’s description of the concurrence power as defeasible, and its use of the “zone of twilight” metaphor (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at pp. 544, 563), we conclude the people of California retained the authority to annul a concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination after it has been issued by the Governor. In other words, the Governor’s exercise of the defeasible concurrence power is itself an act capable of being avoided or undone by the people. No party has presented a different interpretation of section 1 of article II of the California Constitution.

2. *How the Authority to Annul is Exercised*

The second legal question addresses the proper mechanism for the people’s exercise of their power to annul a Governor’s concurrence after it is given. Proposition 48 was a referendum, not an initiative, and, therefore, the question considered here is limited to whether the people’s authority to revoke a concurrence may be exercised by referendum. We regard this legal question as separate from the question of whether the

particular referendum in this case, Proposition 48, actually exercised that authority and annulled the Governor's August 30, 2012 concurrence for the Madera site.

North Fork argues legislation is required to limit the concurrence power, a referendum does not enact legislation, and, therefore, Proposition 48 cannot be viewed as legislation annulling the Governor's concurrence. The state also addresses whether a referendum is an appropriate mechanism for revoking a concurrence. The state argues the electorate's referendum power is limited to acts that are legislative in nature and the Governor's concurrence power is an executive power that is not subject to referendum.

Referendum are addressed in article IV, section 1 of the California Constitution, which provides in full: "The legislative power of this State is vested in the California Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." Article II, section 9, subdivision (a) provides: "The referendum is the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes" subject to certain exceptions inapplicable in this appeal.

California courts routinely recognize their duty to jealously guard the right of the people to the initiative and referendum. (E.g., *Wilde v. City of Dunsmuir* (2020) 9 Cal.5th 1105, 1125; *Martin v. Smith* (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 115, 117.) " 'If doubts can reasonably be resolved in favor of the use of this reserve power, court will preserve it.' " (*Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore* (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 591.) Courts have implemented this principle by adopting a general rule requiring referendum provision be liberally construed to uphold the power. (*Ibid.*; *Rossi v. Brown* (1995) 9 Cal.4th 688, 703.)

The arguments presented by North Fork and the state defendants rooted in concepts of "executive" authority and "legislative" acts are not especially useful in view of the Supreme Court's use of a flexible, nonformalistic approach. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 558.) The court stated: "Rather than attempt to characterize the

Governor's concurrence power as a wholly legislative or executive one, we construe the power as containing features that cut across both categories." (*Id.* at p. 559.)

Accordingly, we reject the state defendants' formalistic argument that the Governor's concurrence is an executive act and, as such, is not subject to referendum. (See *Pacific Rock & Gravel Co. v. City of Upland* (1967) 67 Cal.2d 666, 669 [executive or administrative acts are not subject to the power of referendum].) The power to concur contains features that are both legislative and executive in nature. (See *United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 559 [concurrence power is not wholly legislative or executive; it is construed "as containing features that cut across both categories"].) This combination of legislative and executive functions is why section 1 of article V of the California Constitution, which vests "supreme executive power" in the Governor, does not compel a conclusion that the people possess no authority to revoke a concurrence or, alternatively, a referendum is not the appropriate mechanism for exercising the people's authority to annul a concurrence.

The power of referendum is "the power of the electors to approve or reject statutes or parts of statutes." (Cal. Const., art. II, § 9, subd. (a).) We interpret the Constitution's phrase "statutes or parts of statutes" as referring to legislative actions. This interpretation is based on the principle that reasonable doubts about the referendum power should be resolved in favor of its use. (See *Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra*, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.) When the Governor issues a concurrence in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination, the power being exercised is not wholly legislative or executive, but cuts across both categories. (*United Auburn, supra*, 10 Cal.5th at p. 559.) The legislative aspect of a concurrence renders it subject to the power of referendum and the constitutional provisions stating the supreme executive power is vested in the Governor does not insulate a concurrence from the reach of a referendum. (See Cal. Const., art. V, § 1 [executive power].) Thus, we conclude a referendum is an

appropriate mechanism for annulling a Governor’s concurrence in the Interior Secretary’s two-part determination.

3. *Implied Annulment*

In this case, plaintiffs contend Proposition 48 invalidated the Governor’s concurrence. The official title and summary for Proposition 48, which were prepared by the Attorney General, do not expressly reference the concurrence power or the Governor’s concurrence for the Madera site. Consequently, the facts of this case raise a third issue of constitutional law—specifically, whether the people may *impliedly* annul the Governor’s concurrence.

In *Youngstown, supra*, 343 U.S. 579, the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson stated:

“When the President takes measures incompatible with the *expressed or implied will* of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution for what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” (*Id.* at pp. 637-638, italics added.)

This statement about the relationship between the powers of the executive and the will of the legislative body does not translate directly to the present case. Here, however, we are not concerned with the relationship between two branches of government, but the relationship between the state’s executive officer and the people. Identifying the equilibrium established by our state constitution in that relationship must reflect the fundamental principle that all political power is derived from the people. (Cal. Const., art. II, §1; see *McClatchy Newspapers v. Superior Court, supra*, 44 Cal.3d at p. 1184.) Based on this constitutional principle about power, and our Supreme Court’s reliance on Justice Jackson’s reference to the implied will of Congress, we conclude the people may

impliedly express their will to annul a concurrence issued by the Governor. Where a constitutional power is implicit—that is, has been impliedly granted by the people to the Governor—an appropriate balance is struck by recognizing the people may impliedly annul an exercise of that power. In other words, by parity of reasoning, that which the people granted by implication can be annulled by implication.

4. *Proposition 48*

Based on the foregoing legal conclusions about the people’s power and the use of referenda, we consider whether Proposition 48 is properly interpreted as an exercise of the people’s authority to annul the Governor’s August 30, 2012 concurrence.

Plaintiffs contend “the State’s electorate explicitly rejected the off-reservation casino at issue here” by voting on Proposition 48, which provided clear evidence of legislative disapproval of the Governor’s exercise of the concurrence power for the Madera site. Plaintiffs characterize the vote on Proposition 48 as a veto of all the Governor’s actions related to the compact with North Fork.

In contrast, the state defendants argue Proposition 48 did not eliminate the Governor’s previous concurrence or the Governor’s power to concur. North Fork also contends Proposition 48 did not “purport to restrict the Governor’s concurrence power.” North Fork further asserts there is no authority supporting plaintiff’s contention that a voter referendum addressing a distinct legislative act can impliedly revoke a concurrence issued by the Governor. Under North Fork’s view, Proposition 48 addressed the compact-ratifying statute, kept it from coming into effect, and did not pertain to the concurrence, which is entirely separate from the negotiation, execution and ratification of a compact.

Initially, we consider who drafted Proposition 48. While not decisive, the fact by the official title and summary was prepared by the Attorney General’s Office, which is representing the state defendants, supports applying the general principle that reasonably

doubts should be resolved in favor of the use of the referendum power. (See *Associated Home Builders etc., Inc. v. City of Livermore, supra*, 18 Cal.3d at p. 591.)


Our analysis of the voter's intent in rejecting Proposition 48 also includes the consideration of the consequences that flow from the competing interpretations of Proposition 48. (Cf. *Zieve, Brodnax & Steele, LLP v. Dhindsa* (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 27, 35 [when construing statutory language, courts consider the consequence that will flow from a particular interpretation].) We adopt this approach to interpreting referenda because it is unrealistic to adopt an approach holding the people vote on a referendum without considering the consequences of their vote.

Accordingly, we consider what intent is logically implied by the strict (i.e., literal) interpretation proffered by North Fork and the state defendants. Restricting the voter's rejection of the compact-ratifying statute to the compact itself is the equivalent of inferring the voter's intended to approve the Governor's concurrence. A consequence of this implied approval of the concurrence is that class III gaming would be permitted to occur on the Madera site, but would not be governed by the terms of the compact. Instead, the gaming would be governed by secretarial procedures. (See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(B)(vii) [after mediation, Secretary shall prescribe procedures for the conduct of the class III gaming that are consistent with the proposed compact selected by the mediator].) In this case, those procedures had yet to be adopted when Proposition 48 was rejected in November 2014. Instead, the secretarial procedures were put in place in July 2016. Accordingly, the approach of North Fork and the state defendants treats the voters as rejecting the tribal-state compact negotiated by the Governor and favoring the secretarial procedures that would be subsequently created and imposed by the federal government pursuant to IGRA. The probability of this approach accurately identifying the people's will is, in our view, extremely low.

In comparison, the voter's rejection of the compact-ratifying statute is reasonably interpreted as an expression of their intent to reject class III gaming on the 305-acre Madera site taken into trust in February 2013. This rejection of class III gaming at the Madera site implies the voters disapproved the Governor's concurrence in the Interior Secretary's two-part determination because that concurrence is one of IGRA's conditions that must be satisfied for class III gaming to be allowed at the site. (See 25 U.S.C. § 2719(b)(1)(A).) Therefore, we conclude the people's rejection of Proposition 48 impliedly expressed their will to annul the Governor's August 30, 2012 concurrence for the Madera site. As a result, the demurrers of North Fork and the state defendants should have been overruled.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed and matter is remanded for further proceedings. The trial court is directed to vacate its order sustaining the demurrers and enter a new order overruling them. Appellants are awarded costs on appeal.



SMITH, J.

WE CONCUR:



DETJEN, Acting P.J.



FRANSON, J.