

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 19-5285

STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA!, PATTY JOHNSON,
JOE TEIXEIRA, and LYNN WHEAT,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, DAVID
BERNHARDT, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior, BUREAU OF
INDIAN AFFAIRS, and TARA M. SWEENEY, in her capacity as Assistant
Secretary-Indian Affairs,

Defendants-Appellees,

WILTON RANCHERIA, CALIFORNIA,

Intervenor-Appellee.

*On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia
Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-00058-TNM
Hon. Trevor N. McFadden, Judge Presiding*

**PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC OF PATTY JOHNSON, JOE
TEIXEIRA, and LYNN WHEAT**

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GLOSSARY

APA:	Administrative Procedure Act
AS-IA:	Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs
BIA:	Bureau of Indian Affairs
CRA:	California Rancheria Act of 1958
Department:	Department of the Interior
EIS:	Environmental Impact Statement
FVRA:	Federal Vacancies Reform Act
IRA:	Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
NEPA:	National Environmental Policy Act
Principal Deputy:	Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs
Secretary:	The Secretary of the Interior
Stand Up:	Stand Up for California!, Patty Johnson, Joe Teixeira, and Lynn Wheat
Wilton:	The Wilton Rancheria Tribe

INTRODUCTION AND RULE 35(b) STATEMENT

A two-judge panel of this Court issued an opinion that would permit agencies to act outside regulatory and statutory guiderails and, in doing so, sidestep their duty to “turn square corners in dealing with the people.” *See Dep’t of Homeland Security v. Regents of the Univ. of California*, 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1909 (2020) (quoting *St. Regis Paper Co. v. United States*, 368 U.S. 208, 229 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting)). That decision, if upheld, would have “unusually significant impact[s] on the work of the Circuit” and therefore “warrants the institutional costs” of en banc review. *Bartlett on Behalf of Neuman v. Bowen*, 824 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

The case involves three questions of exceptional importance:

(1) Whether the presumption of delegability applied to statutes should be extended to regulations. In ruling that it should, the panel established a new rule for the D.C. Circuit that overrides regulations that unambiguously allocate decisionmaking authority. Before a rule of that magnitude becomes law in the D.C. Circuit, which handles many administrative law cases, it should be considered by all the judges of the Court.

(2) Whether courts can lower the bar for environmental review under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by removing an agency’s burden to accurately identify a proposed action and conduct a sound environmental review based on that proposed action. The panel weakened NEPA’s “action-forcing”

purpose by permitting the agency to change its proposed action, previously subject to public notice and comment, in a final environmental impact statement (EIS). *See Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (“an [EIS] serves NEPA’s ‘action-forcing’ purpose” by “guarantee[ing] that the relevant information will be made available to the larger audience that may also play a role in both the decisionmaking process and the implementation of that decision.”). If upheld, the panel’s decision would introduce uncertainty about proposed actions under agency consideration.

(3) Whether an agency can reverse the effects of a federal statute decades after the fulfillment of its purpose. The panel decision permits the Department of the Interior (Department) to undo the effect of the California Rancheria Act of 1958 (CRA) through a negotiated settlement without findings of fact, as long as it is court-approved.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 4, 2013, the Department published a notice of intent to prepare an EIS that described the proposed action as the Department’s acquisition of “approximately 282 acres of fee land” in trust for the Wilton Rancheria’s (Wilton) proposed casino in Galt, California. JA943. For the next three years, the Department conducted public environmental review for the Galt site. It was not until December 14, 2016, less than five weeks before its final decision, that the Department

announced in the *final* EIS that it intended to take into trust a parcel of land in Elk Grove instead. JA2456; JA2458. Two days after the close of the comment period, the Department approved the transfer of the Elk Grove site. JA2533–2622. The Department acquired title to the Elk Grove site on February 10, 2017. JA28–30; JA31–38. The Department did not then, nor has it ever, published notice of the decision in the Federal Register, as the regulations expressly require. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c)(2)(ii).

In the lower court, Appellants twice moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) agency regulations limit final trust authority to the Secretary and the AS–IA, (2) Section 10 of the CRA prohibited the Department from acquiring the Elk Grove site in trust, and (3) the Department violated NEPA by, *inter alia*, announcing a new proposed action in a final EIS.¹ The court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on those counts.²

Appellants filed this appeal on October 21, 2019. *See* Notice of Appeal, No. 19-5285, Doc. #1812586, page 23 of 94. Oral argument was held before Judges Garland, Pillard and Wilkins on November 9, 2020, and a two-judge panel issued a decision on April 16, 2021, with then-Attorney General Garland not participating.

¹ *See* JA328–354; JA0857–889.

² JA328–354; JA355–56; JA857–889; JA890–91.

Id., Doc. #1894861. The opinion upholds the trust decision. *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep't of the Interior*, 994 F.3d 616 (D.C. Cir. 2021).

The panel holds that (1) the Department was not foreclosed from re delegating the authority under 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c) to approve final trust acquisition decisions, *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 621–26; (2) the Department’s EIS was not deficient enough to undermine informed public comment and informed decision making, *id.* at 630–27; and (3) a court-approved settlement agreement is sufficient to restore recognition of a tribe and Indian status for members of that tribe notwithstanding the CRA, *id.* at 626–27.

REASONS FOR GRANTING REHEARING EN BANC

A. The panel’s new re delegation rule will have repercussions beyond the Department’s regulations.

En banc review is warranted because the panel decision establishes a rule that will control how agency delegation regulations are interpreted. The D.C. Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction over many challenges to administrative action and hears a large share of United States administrative law cases.³ The panel’s decision would have “unusually significant impact[s] on the work of the Circuit” and therefore “warrants the institutional costs” of en banc review. *Bartlett*, 824 F.2d at 1246.

³ Jeffrey Brandon Morris, *CALMLY TO POISE THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF THE COURTS OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT* 285 (2001) (listing regulatory statutes under which the D.C. Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction).

A presumption of delegability has long applied to statutes. Courts generally presume that the powers Congress assigns through federal statutes are delegable “absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent.” *U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC*, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004). Because Congress writes statutes that give heads of agencies responsibility for “more tasks than a single person could ever accomplish,” Congress “necessarily assum[es] that the head of the agency will delegate the task to a subordinate officer.” *Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. Covidien LP*, 812 F.3d 1023, 1031 (Fed. Cir. 2016). In other words, Congress expects agencies to determine who has certain responsibilities and authorities through rulemaking.

That is precisely what the Department did here when it revised its regulations in 2013 that unambiguously restrict who can make final trust decisions: “[a trust] decision made by the Secretary, or the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs pursuant to delegated authority, is a final agency action under 5 U.S.C. 704 upon issuance.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c); 78 Fed. Reg. 67928, 67937 (Dec. 13, 2013). All other trust decisions are not final. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d) (“[a trust] decision made by a Bureau of Indian Affairs official pursuant to delegated authority is *not a final agency action* of the Department under 5 U.S.C. 704 until administrative remedies are exhausted under part 2 of this chapter or until the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired and no administrative appeal has been filed.” (emphasis added)). The panel, however, concluded that the presumption of delegability now applies to regulations

and, for that reason, Section 151.12 does not foreclose redelegation of the final action authority of the Secretary and AS–IA. *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 624–25.

The Court has never extended the presumption of delegability to regulations, and there is good reason not to. First, the public relies on the regulations to understand agency decisionmaking. When regulations explicitly delegate responsibilities and authorities, the public has a reasonable expectation that the agency will abide by those delegations. If the agency does not, it creates confusion and undermines faith in agency decisionmaking. *See Dep’t of Homeland Security*, 140 S. Ct. at 1909 (quoting *St. Regis Paper Co.*, 368 U.S. at 229 (Black, J., dissenting)) (“the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”).

Second, notice and comment rules have the force and effect of law and require the direct involvement of the regulated public. When agency regulations allocate statutory responsibilities to agency officials in clear terms, applying the presumption of delegability introduces uncertainty by negating what is otherwise a clear division of responsibility and undercuts the rulemaking process through which the agency delegated in the first place.

The panel rationalizes its decision by noting that an agency could “quickly reverse an unintended redelegation” because “the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary could simply invalidate any action taken pursuant to the claimed authority.” *Stand*

Up, 994 F.3d at 623. But that is not so. For final trust decisions, the regulations direct the *immediate* acquisition of title in trust, 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c)(2)(iii), and the United States will only remove land from trust upon court order. *See* 78 Fed. Reg. at 67934 (“If a court determines that the Department erred in making a land-into-trust decision, the Department will comply with a final court order and any judicial remedy that is imposed.”). Because the regulated public relies on the finality of agency decisions before taking certain actions (e.g., securing financing for project development, initiating new operations with impacts on air and water), the public should not be left confused whether an agency action is final. It is the agency’s burden to comply with its regulations *as written* to avoid confusion. That is especially so when, like this case, the agency already promulgated a regulation that clearly states which officials can make final decisions, and which cannot.

Although it may be more difficult for Congress to enact or change a statute, it is not simple or easy for an agency to revise its regulations through rulemaking. *See Air Transp. Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric.*, 317 F. Supp. 3d 385, 392 (D.D.C. 2018) (“formal rulemaking is a time-consuming process”); *see also Farmers All. for Improved Regul. v. Madigan*, No. Civ. A. No. 89-0959(RCL), 1991 WL 178117, at *12 n.11 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 1991) (describing formal rulemaking as a “time-consuming and costly process”).

In the trust context, to presume delegability of duties that the regulations expressly state belong to the Secretary and the AS–IA is not only inconsistent with the plain language of the regulation, 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c), it also may be used to circumvent the Federal Vacancies Reform Act (FVRA). The FVRA prohibits inferior officers from performing a function or duty exclusive to a superior officer. A function or duty is exclusive when it “is established by regulation; and . . . is required by such regulation to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer).” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(B). The panel asserts that the language in Section 151.12 does not expressly limit final trust authority to the Secretary and the AS–IA. *See Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 624. But exceedingly few federal statutes and virtually no regulations state that a power is limited “only” to a specific individual.⁴ If agencies are not held to regulations delegating final decisionmaking authority, the FVRA’s limitations may be easily evaded because virtually every power could be presumed delegable. Moreover, the panel’s rationale that senior officials could simply reverse unintended redelegations runs into the FVRA’s mandate that actions taken in violation of the statute “shall have no force or effect” and “may not be ratified.”

⁴ There is no dispute that Lawrence Roberts was not serving as the Secretary or AS–IA—the two officers with exclusive authority to issue final trust decisions—when he approved the trust acquisition on January 19, 2017. Roberts served as the Acting AS-IA for 210 days, pursuant to 5 U.S.C. §§ 3345(a)(1); 3346(a)(1), and returned to his role as Principal Deputy before January 19.

5 U.S.C. § 3348(d). If agencies are permitted to easily skirt the requirements under the FVRA, the statute would be rendered impotent.

The panel briefly explains that “while we have never held that [the presumption of redelegability] applies to regulations, we conclude that it does so today.” *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 623. In this case, that presumption permitted the very decision the FVRA prohibited. Extending the presumption would reach the regulations of *all* agencies, not just Secretarial trust decisions. A change of this gravity merits en banc review. *Church of Scientology of California v. Foley*, 640 F.2d 1335, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (the “cases meriting en banc treatment are those involving ‘issue(s) likely to affect many other cases’ in other words, those of real significance to the legal process as well as to the litigants.”).

B. The panel effectively removed any burden on an agency to accurately inform the public of a proposed action under NEPA.

The panel concluded that the Final EIS issued for the Elk Grove trust acquisition was not deficient enough to merit vacatur or remand. *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 627–30. But the issue in this case is not whether the EIS was deficient—though it was. It is whether agencies will be required to follow NEPA’s “action-forcing procedures,” which are designed to notify the public of and encourage public participation in the environmental review process.

NEPA regulations work to ensure that the public is clearly informed about proposed actions an agency is considering. They do so by requiring agencies to

“define the proposal that is the subject of an [EIS]” when they initiate an EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a).⁵ The regulations also require agencies to publish notice when they intend to prepare an EIS, and that notice must include a “description of the proposed action and alternatives the environmental impact statement will consider.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.9(d). These regulations not only make clear that a “proposed action” is different from “possible alternatives,” they also emphasize the importance of properly defining the first. How an agency defines a proposed action influences the entire review process and, critically here, determines what the public is given notice of. A notice that does not identify the actual proposed action under review violates NEPA because it does not allow for informed public participation and decision-making. *See Dep’t of Homeland Security*, 140 S. Ct. at 1909 (quoting *St. Regis Paper Co.*, 368 U.S. at 229 (Black, J., dissenting)) (“the Government should turn square corners in dealing with the people.”).

In the trust context, it is uniquely important to require the Department to identify the parcel of land involved, because of the significance of the decision—trust acquisitions eliminate state and local jurisdiction and create new sovereign territory—and because the public rarely knows what lands a tribe may have an option to purchase. The public relies on the agency’s identification of the proposed action

⁵ On September 14, 2020, revisions to the regulations implementing NEPA went into effect. *See* 85 Fed. Reg. 43304 (July 16, 2020). These revisions did not meaningfully change the provisions at issue here.

under consideration. In addition, initial public notices often do not specifically identify “possible alternatives,” as was the case here, thus, the public would not know to participate from the start of the process.⁶

When an agency fails at step one to provide proper notice of the proposed action, it is impossible to fairly assess whether the environmental impacts of the *actual* proposed action were adequately considered. Ignoring the plain language of the regulations, the panel excused this deficiency by treating the phrase “preferred alternative” as synonymous with a “proposed action.” But when a trust application lists a specific parcel, it is not reasonable to assume a different parcel could be acquired, unless the Department makes that clear. In the trust acquisition context, “the only federal action that is involved when a non-federal applicant seeks federal approval or funding is the agency’s decision to grant or deny the applicant’s request.” *Citizens Against Burlington, Inc. v. Busey*, 938 F.2d 190, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (Buckley, J., dissenting in part). It should not be the public’s burden to deduce that an agency does not mean what it says when it identifies a proposed action.

When a tribe decides that it would prefer a different parcel of land be acquired in trust and files a new application for that purpose, that is a new proposed action

⁶ The Department did not identify the acquisition of land in Elk Grove as the proposed action or a possible alternative in its notice of intent to prepare an EIS; instead, it notified the public of the proposed acquisition of the Galt site. 78 Fed. Reg. 72928 (identifying “the proposed action for the Department” as “the acquisition requested by the Tribe,” 282 acres in Galt).

requiring an EIS. 25 C.F.R. § 151.9 (“An individual Indian or tribe desiring to acquire land in trust status shall file a written request for approval of such acquisition with the Secretary,” which must include “a description of the land to be acquired.”). It is not enough that the EIS considered the new site as an alternative because the public—which could not have known that the tribe might change its proposed action—was deprived of the opportunity to participate at the outset.⁷ See *Half Moon Bay Fishermans’ Mktg. Ass’n v. Carlucci*, 857 F.2d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 1988) (“[A]n agency’s failure to disclose a proposed action before the issuance of a final EIS defeats NEPA’s goal of encouraging public participation in the development of information *during* the decision making process.” (emphasis in original)).

⁷ Here, the Department refused to issue an EIS or prepare a supplemental EIS, for the new action. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(d)(1) (agencies must “prepare supplements to either draft or final [EISs]” if “[t]he agency *makes substantial changes to the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns*; or [t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.”) (emphasis added). Instead, it tucked hundreds of pages of new analyses for the Elk Grove site into appendices to the Final EIS, contrary to the requirement that a draft EIS be reasonably complete. JA2533–2622; see, e.g., mitigation agreements (JA1556–1613), economic reports (JA1614–660), biological reports (JA1661–689), cultural studies (JA1690–91), traffic studies (JA1692–95), environmental site assessments (JA1696–1922), and air quality monitoring (JA1923–2453). The panel did not view these additional pages as “a significant development . . . requiring supplementation.” *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d at 629. But the “significant development” was the change in proposed action. The public did not have any meaningful opportunity to review and comment on the additional analyses.

If an agency can change a proposed action without initiating a new EIS—or, at the least, a supplemental EIS—it would be possible for an agency to propose one action, focus the environmental review on that action, and, at the last minute, switch to another action; and all the while the portions of the public most affected by the actual action are none the wiser. Whether intentional or not, that is exactly what the Department did in this case. After all, it is far easier to address public concerns if the public does not know to raise them.

The panel's decision would relax the public notice requirement under NEPA, allowing agency actions to undergo environmental review without focusing the public on the actual proposed action at issue. Lowering the bar for agencies' NEPA review would have far-reaching effects for other cases as well as the legal process itself. *See Church of Scientology of California*, 640 F.2d at 1341.

C. The Court should conduct en banc review before allowing settlement to negate Section 10(b) of the CRA.

The panel's decision gives the Department the power to undo the Congressional intent of legislation. The California Rancheria Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619, terminated the trust relationship with the members of 41 rancherias. Termination was voluntary; only those Indians who voted to be terminated in exchange for fee title to rancheria property were included in the Act. *Id.* § 2(b).

Indians—like those living at Wilton—understood that by agreeing to the termination of their trust relationship with the United States, all federal statutes “which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them” upon the distribution of rancheria lands. *Id.* § 10(b). That necessarily includes Section 5 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), which authorizes the Secretary to acquire lands in trust for “Indians.” 25 U.S.C. § 5108.

The Department is bound by federal law; it cannot override a federal mandate merely by agreeing with the Indians who received federal land to disregard it. *See, e.g., Keith v. Volpe*, 118 F.3d 1386, 1393 (9th Cir. 1997) (parties to consent decree “could not agree to terms which would exceed their authority and supplant state law”); *Kasper v. Bd. of Election Comm’rs*, 814 F.2d 332, 341–42 (7th Cir. 1987) (“A consent decree is not a method by which state agencies may liberate themselves from the statutes enacted by the legislature that created them.”); *Dunn v. Carey*, 808 F.2d 555, 559–60 (7th Cir. 1986) (“Because a consent decree’s force comes from agreement rather than positive law, the decree depends on the parties’ authority to give assent.”) (citing *United States v. Beebe*, 180 U.S. 343, 351–55 (1901)).

The panel cites *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*, 879 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2018), for the proposition that court-approved settlement agreements are “sufficient to restore recognition of a tribe *and* to restore Indian status for members of that tribe notwithstanding the Rancheria Act.” *Stand Up*, 994 F.3d

at 626 (emphasis in original). But that case did not affirm the validity of the underlying settlement agreement because no party in that case challenged it. Instead, the issue was whether former residents were members of the same tribe, the North Fork Rancheria of Mono Indians, as the new residents. 879 F.3d at 1181–86. The court pointed to a 1983 settlement agreement purely as evidence that the North Fork existed at the time the CRA was enacted and did not determine the legality of the settlement itself. *Id.* at 1184–85.

Further, the panel reads authority into the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (List Act) that is not there. Pub. L. No. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791, 4792 (Nov. 2, 1994). The List Act requires that the Department publish a list of all federally recognized tribes annually in the Federal Register. *See* 25 U.S.C. § 5131. It does not, however, authorize the restoration of congressionally-terminated tribes through court-approved settlements or abrogate restrictions that apply to Indians receiving rancheria property. A tribe can be federally recognized as such and, at the same time, be subject to the limitations under Section 5 of the IRA due to its decision to terminate under the CRA. That is the case here.

The panel's decision to uphold the trust acquisition here effectively allows the Department to erase the clear language in both the CRA and the IRA, whenever it decides to do so, even decades later.⁸

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for rehearing en banc should be granted.

⁸ If the Court has concerns about the status of trust acquisitions approved for tribes subsequent to settlement agreements, the six-year statute of limitations for actions brought against the United States should assuage those concerns. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a); *Big Lagoon Rancheria v. California*, 789 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2015), as amended on denial of reh'g (July 8, 2015) (rejecting California's arguments that BIA improperly held a parcel in trust for Big Lagoon Rancheria, both because the state failed to file the appropriate action and because such action would be time-barred under Section 2401(a)).

Dated: June 1, 2021

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ADDENDUM

Panel Opinion (Apr. 16, 2021).....Add. 1

Statutory and Regulatory Provisions:

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United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued November 9, 2020

Decided April 16, 2021

No. 19-5285

STAND UP FOR CALIFORNIA!, ET AL.,
APPELLANTS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, ET AL.,
APPELLEES

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(No. 1:17-cv-00058)

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Before: GARLAND*, PILLARD and WILKINS, *Circuit Judges*.

Opinion for the Court filed by *Circuit Judge* WILKINS.

WILKINS, *Circuit Judge*: This appeal comes after a seven-year effort by the Department of the Interior (“Department”) to acquire land in trust on behalf of the Wilton Rancheria (“Wilton” or “Tribe”) to build a casino. After the Department finalized the acquisition of a parcel of land in Elk Grove, California, Stand Up for California! (“Stand Up”), Patty Johnson, Joe Teixeira, and Lynn Wheat (collectively “Appellants”) sued the Department. They brought a litany of claims, including claims that the Department (1) impermissibly delegated the authority to make a final agency action to acquire the land to an official who could not wield this authority, (2) was barred from acquiring land in trust on behalf of Wilton’s members, and (3) failed to adhere to its National Environmental Protection Act obligations when it selected the Elk Grove location. Appellants and the Department cross-moved for summary judgment, and the District Court granted the Department’s motions on all counts. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the District Court.

I.

The Wilton Rancheria is an Indian tribe based in the Sacramento area.¹ Wilton’s members are descendants of

* Judge Garland was a member of the panel at the time this case was submitted but did not participate in the final disposition of the case.

¹ A rancheria is a small Indian settlement in California. See *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior*, 879 F.3d 1177, 1179 (D.C. Cir. 2018); William Wood, *The Trajectory of Indian Country in California: Rancherías, Villages, Pueblos, Missions, Ranchos*,

Miwok and Niensen speakers. As with its general policy regarding tribal sovereignty, the federal government's approach to Wilton has gone through "drastic fits and starts," vacillating "between coercing assimilation and encouraging tribal self-government." Philip P. Frickey, *Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law*, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1990). Wilton was first federally recognized in 1927, when Congress initiated a program that provided land to Indians who were not on reservations. After Congress passed the Indian Reorganization Act in 1934, Wilton adopted a constitution.

In 1958, however, Congress disestablished Wilton and forty other reservations through the California Rancheria Act ("Rancheria Act"). Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619 (1958). The Rancheria Act directed the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") to dissolve the trusts in which the Secretary held land for forty-one rancherias and tribes, including Wilton, and to distribute the assets. The Secretary was directed to consult with the affected tribes and prepare a plan to distribute the assets or to sell the assets and distribute the profits to the affected tribes' members. Pursuant to this mandate, the Secretary terminated the government-to-government relationship with Wilton and began consultations with the Tribe's members to transfer federal land trust ownership to individual fee ownership. In 1959, the Department approved a distribution plan that would terminate the federal trusteeship of the Tribe, distribute the assets to the Tribe's members, and revoke the Tribe's constitution and bylaws. Once the Tribe's assets had been distributed, the distribution agreement stipulated that the Tribe's members were no longer entitled to the federal government's services because of their status as Indians. In 1964, the Department announced in the *Federal*

Reservations, Colonies, and Rancherias, 44 TULSA L. REV. 317, 319 (2008).

Register that the Wilton Tribe's members were no longer entitled to services reserved for Indians. *Termination of Federal Supervision*, 29 Fed. Reg. 13,146 (Sept. 15, 1964).

In 1979, members of several California rancherias, including Wilton members, brought a class action against the Department for unlawfully terminating the federal government's trust relationship with their tribes. Four years later, the government settled and "agree[d] to 'restore[] and confirm[]' Indian status for some who had lost it" pursuant to the Rancheria Act, including seventeen tribes that had lost their tribal status under the Act. *Stand Up for California! v. U.S. Dep't of Interior*, 879 F.3d 1177, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting Stipulation for Entry of Judgment, *Hardwick*, No. C-79-1710-SW, ¶¶ 2-4 (Aug. 3, 1983)). But Wilton was excluded from the settlement agreement because the district court mistakenly concluded that "[n]o class member from [Wilton] currently owns property within the original rancheria boundaries." *Wilton Miwok Rancheria v. Salazar*, 2010 WL 693420, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 2010) (quoting Certificate of Counsel re Hearing on Approval of Settlement of Class Actions, *Hardwick*, No. C-79-1710-SW (Nov. 16, 1983)).

Almost forty years later, members of the Tribe sued the Department, seeking federal recognition of the Wilton Rancheria and the acquisition of certain land into trust by the government on the Tribe's behalf. *Id.* at *3. Two years later, the Tribe and the government entered into a settlement agreement. The Department acknowledged that "the United States failed to comply with the Rancheria Act in terminating the Wilton Rancheria and distributing its assets." *Id.* The Department thus recognized that the Tribe was not lawfully terminated. The Department also agreed to restore federal recognition of the Tribe and to "accept in trust certain lands formerly belonging to" Wilton. *Id.* at *3. In June 2009, the district court in California entered the settlement agreement as

a stipulated judgment. After the case settled, the Department published notice of the restoration of Wilton's status as a federally recognized tribe. Since then, the Wilton Rancheria has been listed on the Department's annual list of federally recognized tribes.

In 2013, Wilton petitioned the Department to acquire land in trust on the Tribe's behalf so that it could build a casino. The Tribe proposed a 282-acre plot near Galt, California. Pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347, the Department began the process to assess the environmental effect a casino would have. After soliciting public comment, the Department published a scoping report for its environmental impact statement ("EIS"). The scoping report identified seven alternatives for the land acquisition, including a 30-acre parcel in Elk Grove and the Galt site, which the report described as Wilton's "proposed action," *see* 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14; 43 C.F.R. § 46.30, but it did not identify a preferred alternative. *See* 43 C.F.R. § 46.420(d) (defining the "preferred alternative" as the alternative that the agency "believes would best accomplish the purpose and need of the proposed action while fulfilling its statutory mission and responsibilities, giving consideration to economic, environmental, technical, and other factors"). Two years later, the Department published the draft EIS, where it considered the alternatives in detail. It then held a public hearing on the draft EIS. At the hearing, multiple parties—including one of the plaintiffs in this litigation—spoke in favor of the Elk Grove location. Following the hearing, Wilton changed its preference and submitted a request that the Department acquire the Elk Grove location rather than the Galt location.

In November 2016, the Department requested comment from interested parties about a potential casino in the Elk Grove location. The list of notified parties included the State of California, the City of Elk Grove, and Stand Up. Stand Up

responded that transferring title to the Elk Grove location would moot multiple pending state-court challenges seeking to prevent the acquisition and urged the Department to delay title transfer. The Department denied Stand Up's request. The Department then published its final EIS, which identified the Elk Grove location as the preferred alternative.

On January 19, 2017, the Department issued a Record of Decision ("ROD") that constituted the final agency action to acquire the Elk Grove location in trust on Wilton's behalf. Lawrence Roberts—the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs—signed the ROD pursuant to delegated authority. Roberts had served as Acting Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs ("AS-IA"), but after his acting status lapsed pursuant to the Federal Vacancies Reform Act ("FVRA"), Roberts continued to exercise the non-exclusive functions and duties of the AS-IA. The same day Roberts issued the ROD, then-Deputy Secretary Michael Connor had issued a memorandum ("Connor Memorandum") that sought to clarify that Roberts was exercising non-exclusive functions and duties of the AS-IA. On February 10, the Department acquired title to the Elk Grove location. Michael Black, who had assumed the role of Acting AS-IA in the new presidential administration, signed off on this acquisition after denying Stand Up's administrative appeal for a stay pending judicial review.

Appellants brought this lawsuit prior to the issuance of the Department's ROD and sought a temporary restraining order, which the District Court denied. Appellants' lawsuit alleged, *inter alia*, that (1) the FVRA and Department regulations precluded the Principal Deputy from exercising the authority to sign off on the ROD acquiring the Elk Grove land in trust; (2) Principal Deputy Roberts was acting without authority when he acquired the title in trust for the Tribe; (3) the Department could not acquire land in trust on behalf of

Wilton's members pursuant to the Rancheria Act; and (4) the Department violated NEPA and the APA by failing to prepare a supplemental or new EIS after it selected the Elk Grove location as its preferred alternative. Wilton intervened on behalf of the Department. After the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, the District Court granted the Department's summary judgment motions. This appeal followed.

We review the District Court's grant of summary judgment *de novo*. *W. Surety Co. v. U.S. Eng'g Constr., LLC*, 955 F.3d 100, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2020). We "evaluat[e] the administrative record directly and invalidat[e] the Department's actions only if, based on that record, they are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." *Stand Up!*, 879 F.3d at 1181 (internal quotation omitted).

II.

We begin with Appellants' challenge to the Department's redelegation of final decision-making authority to the Principal Deputy. First, Appellants claim that the regulation in question prohibits redelegation beyond the AS-IA. Second, Appellants argue that even if the regulation permitted redelegation, the Department failed to properly redelegate this power to Principal Deputy Roberts.

We reject both of Appellants' challenges. First, the text, structure, and purpose of the regulation confirm that the Department has the power to redelegate final decision-making authority. Second, the Department properly redelegated the final decision-making authority to Principal Deputy Roberts. We therefore affirm the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the government on these claims.

A.

The Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) has promulgated regulations governing who can make land acquisitions on behalf of Indian tribes. The regulations define “Secretary” as “the Secretary of the Interior or authorized representative.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.2. The Secretary must review each request for the acquisition of land. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(a). Section 151.12(c) states that “[a] decision made by the Secretary, or the [AS–IA] pursuant to delegated authority, is a final agency action.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c). In contrast, Section 151.12(d) provides that “[a] decision made by a [BIA] official pursuant to delegated authority is not a final agency action of the Department . . . until administrative remedies are exhausted.” *Id.* § 151.12(d).

To determine whether redelegation of final decision-making authority is permissible, we must first assess whether the power is an exclusive function or duty of the Secretary or the AS–IA. The FVRA forecloses the delegation of exclusive duties and authorities to a successor official after expiration of the statutorily authorized 210-day period of acting-capacity service. The FVRA also establishes that a function or duty is exclusive when it is either “established by statute, and . . . required by statute to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer)” or when it “is established by regulation and . . . is required by such regulation to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer).” 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(A)–(B).² If Congress wants to make clear that a

² Although Appellants have not raised their FVRA claims on appeal, the statute still provides guideposts to which we should adhere in analyzing the challenge to delegated authority. *Cf. United Sav. Ass’n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd.*, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (“[C]onstruction . . . is a holistic endeavor. A provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the

function or duty is exclusive, it may do so through clear statutory mandates. *See, e.g.*, 25 U.S.C. § 3407(a) (“The Secretary shall have *exclusive authority* to approve or disapprove a plan submitted by an Indian tribe” (emphasis added)). Alternatively, as the Supreme Court recognized in *United States v. Giordano*, a statute may foreclose redelegation when its text, “fairly read” in light of the statutory purpose, evinces a congressional desire to render a function or duty exclusive and non-redelegable. 416 U.S. 505, 514 (1974). Should Congress remain silent on the issue, however, the FVRA provides the Executive Branch with leeway to set out which functions or duties are exclusive and which are not. *See* 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(A)–(B); *see also* FEDERAL VACANCIES REFORM ACT OF 1998, S. Rep. No. 105–250, at 31 (“We must be clear that the non-delegable duties we intend to have performed only by the agency head in the event of a vacancy . . . are only those expressly vested by law or regulation exclusively in the vacant position. In this regard, we acknowledge and appreciate the Majority’s statement that ‘all the normal functions of government thus could still be performed.’”). Appellants do not argue that any statute vests exclusive authority with the Secretary or the AS–IA, and we are unaware of any such statute. We must therefore determine whether the Department itself has cabined this authority.

Relying on the text of Section 151.12, Appellants argue that the Department has restricted final decision-making authority to the Secretary or to the AS–IA. Appellants contend that because Section 151.12(c) provides that final decisions can be made by the AS–IA “pursuant to delegated authority,” while Section 151.12(d) sets out the procedures for non-final decisions made by BIA officials, the Department has made

remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”).

final decision-making authority an exclusive function. We disagree. While Section 151.12 certainly contemplates that the actions of the Secretary and the AS–IA will constitute final agency action, when fairly read, it does not foreclose redelegation of these duties.

To begin, we hold that, contrary to Appellants’ assertions, the presumption in favor of redelegability applies to regulations. We have previously recognized that “[w]hen a statute delegates authority to a federal officer or agency, subdelegation to a subordinate federal officer . . . is presumptively permissible absent affirmative evidence of a contrary congressional intent.” *U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC*, 359 F.3d 554, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2004); *see also Kobach v. U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n*, 772 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (“[C]ircuits that have spoken on this issue are unanimous in permitting subdelegations to subordinates, even where the enabling statute is silent, so long as the enabling statute and its legislative history do not indicate a prohibition on subdelegation.”). And while we have never held that this presumption applies to regulations, we conclude that it does so today. Indeed, the presumption in favor of redelegability may be more appropriate for regulations than it is for statutes because an agency has many tools to quickly reverse an unintended redelegation. Should any lower-ranking official exceed his or her powers and attempt to exercise an exclusive function or duty pursuant to a redelegation, the Secretary or the Deputy Secretary could simply invalidate any action taken pursuant to the claimed authority. In contrast, as a practical matter it is harder for Congress to claw back any function or duty that a lower-ranking official exercises contrary to Congress’s intent to reserve it for the Secretary. And while an agency could amend its regulations to change which functions or duties are exclusive, Congress ensured that an agency cannot suddenly render an exclusive function or duty non-exclusive by requiring the regulation to be in effect during the 180 days

preceding any vacancy. 5 U.S.C. § 3348(a)(2)(B)(ii). An agency thus cannot amend its regulations to render an exclusive function non-exclusive as an end-run around the restrictions Congress set for acting officers in the FVRA. Given these considerations, we hold that the presumption in favor of redelegability applies to regulations.

With this presumption in mind, we turn to the text. As with statutes, regulations must be construed holistically. *See Am. Paper Inst., Inc. v. EPA*, 996 F.2d 346, 356 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1993); *see also Carlson v. Postal Regulatory Comm'n*, 938 F.3d 337, 349 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (“[I]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence . . . but look to the provisions of the whole law.” (quoting *Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Env’tl. Control v. EPA*, 895 F.3d 90, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2018))). Here, the regulatory text provides two methods by which the Department can acquire land in trust. Section 151.12(d) contemplates that the decision to take land into trust may be delegated to a BIA official, but the BIA official’s decision would be subject to administrative review. 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(d). Alternatively, the Department may acquire the land in trust through “[a] decision made by the Secretary, or the [AS–IA] pursuant to delegated authority,” which “is a final agency action” and not subject to the administrative review process. *Id.* § 151.12(c). But the regulation also defines “Secretary” to include any “authorized representative.” *Id.* § 151.2(a). Because of this inclusive definition, we conclude that the regulation’s text, when fairly read, contemplates redelegation of the Section 151.12(c) authority by the Secretary.

The Department’s other regulations confirm our reading of Section 151.12. As other regulations make clear, the Department knows how to use language that renders a function or duty exclusive to a particular official. *See, e.g.*, 25 C.F.R. § 33.3 (“The administrative and programmatic authorities of the

Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs pertaining to Indian education functions shall not be delegated to other than the Director, Office of Indian Education Programs.”); *id.* § 262.5(a) (“Area Directors may delegate this authority to Agency Superintendents, but only . . . to those who have adequate professional support available.”); 43 C.F.R. § 20.202(b)(1) (“Each Ethics Counselor shall . . . [o]rder disciplinary or remedial action This authority may not be redelegated.”). But in promulgating Section 151.12, the Department refrained from using any similar language. Appellants argue that the Department shut the door on redelegation in providing that the AS–IA will act “pursuant to delegated authority.” 25 C.F.R. § 151.12(c). But this language pales in comparison to the language the Department typically uses to bar redelegation. The Department’s decision not to use such prohibitory language thus supports our conclusion that a fair reading of the regulation permits redelegation beyond the AS–IA.

Appellants invoke the *expressio unius* canon to argue that the regulation’s explicit mention of the AS–IA forecloses redelegation beyond the AS–IA. But as we have made clear, the *expressio unius* canon “is often misused” because drafters include duplicative language to ensure “that the mentioned item is covered—without meaning to exclude the unmentioned ones.” *Shook v. D.C. Fin. Resp. & Mgmt. Assistance Auth.*, 132 F.3d 775, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Moreover, as the Second Circuit has recognized, the *expressio unius* canon carries even less weight in the redelegation context, where the statute or regulation “may mention a specific official only to make it clear that this official has a particular power rather than to exclude delegation to other officials.” *United States v. Mango*, 199 F.3d 85, 90 (2d Cir. 1999). Section 151.12(c) is emblematic of the shortcomings of the *expressio unius* canon in the redelegation context. Although the regulation explicitly mentions the AS–IA, it incorporates the definition of

“Secretary” from Section 151.2(a) which includes any “authorized representative.” Nothing else in the regulation’s text suggests that the Department intended to limit the redelegation to the AS–IA, and invoking the *expressio unius* canon would require us to ignore the regulation’s definition of “Secretary.” Instead, we believe it a fairer reading of the regulation that the Department was merely making clear that the AS–IA had been delegated the authority of final decision-making, not that the AS–IA alone could exercise this authority. We therefore decline to apply the *expressio unius* canon to Section 151.12.

Section 151.12’s purpose also supports our reading of the regulation. As with statutes, we may look to the purpose and drafting history of the regulation to confirm whether our interpretation of the text comports with the Department’s intent in promulgating Section 151.12. *See U.S. Telecom Ass’n*, 359 F.3d at 565; *Giordano*, 416 U.S. at 514. Here, the Department’s goal in amending Section 151.12 affirms our understanding that the Department did not intend to prohibit redelegation of this function. Section 151.12 was amended in 2013 to “[p]rovide clarification and transparency to the process for issuing decisions by the Department, whether the decision is made by the Secretary, [AS–IA], or a [BIA] official.” *Land Acquisitions: Appeals of Land Acquisition Decisions*, 78 Fed. Reg. 67,928, 67,929 (Nov. 13, 2013). The Department was not focused on who could wield the authority to make final decisions. Rather, the Department sought to clarify whether an acquisition of land was final and what means of review were available to aggrieved parties: The decisions of the Secretary and AS–IA are final and appealable, it explained, and the decisions of BIA officials are not. In adopting that rule of finality, the Department said nothing of the authority of other Department officials, such as the Deputy AS–IA, to act. And in any event, finality is a benefit as well as a limitation. Instead of being required to proceed through the administrative appeals

process, a decision made under Section 151.12(c) permits aggrieved parties to immediately seek judicial review before an Article III court.³ The Department's purpose in promulgating Section 151.12 thus confirms that the Department did not seek to foreclose redelegation of final decisions to acquire land into trust.

Appellants' reliance on *Giordano* is misplaced. There, the Supreme Court interpreted a statute where Congress provided that "[t]he Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General" could authorize a wiretap, *Giordano*, 416 U.S. at 513 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2516(1)), but the challenged decision was made by the Attorney General's Executive Assistant. *Id.* Although the Court concluded that the statute's text, when "fairly read, was intended to limit the power to authorize wiretap applications," *id.* at 514, it reached this conclusion after contrasting the narrow delegation of Section 2516(1) with 28 U.S.C. § 510, which granted the Attorney General broad authority to delegate his power. Thus, because the statute in question used narrower language than the broader delegation, the Court determined that the Attorney General was restricted in his ability to delegate his wiretapping authority. In the present case, however, other regulations show that when the Department intends to render a function or duty exclusive, it says so clearly. And unlike the statute at issue in *Giordano*, *see id.* at 514–21, the history of Section 151.12 does not evince an intent by the drafters to restrict who could wield final decision-making

³ It is also noteworthy that the Department has maintained its position that this function is redelegable over three presidential administrations. Appellants stress the breakneck speed that the Obama administration undertook to finalize the acquisition, but over four years later, two administrations never wavered from the position that this authority is redelegable.

authority, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,929. We therefore hold that Section 151.12 permits redelegation beyond the AS-IA.

B.

We next turn to Appellants' argument that the Department failed to properly redelegate the final decision-making authority to Principal Deputy Roberts. Appellants contend that because the Department did not adhere to the redelegation procedures set forth in the Departmental Manual, the redelegation—either through automatic redelegation or through the Connor Memorandum—was impermissible. We reject Appellants' challenge.

Even if violation of the Departmental Manual supported a third-party claim—which we doubt, *see Schweiker v. Hansen*, 450 U.S. 785, 789–90 (1981); *Chiron Corp. & PerSeptive Biosystems, Inc. v. NTSB*, 198 F.3d 935, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1999)—Appellants' challenge still fails on its merits. Principal Deputy Roberts began serving as the Acting AS-IA in January 2016. After his term as AS-IA lapsed pursuant to the FVRA, Roberts reverted to his position as Principal Deputy. But under the Departmental Manual, the Principal Deputy “may exercise the [non-exclusive] authority delegated” to the AS-IA “[i]n the [AS-IA's] absence.” 209 DM 8.4A. Appellants attempt to distinguish an “absence” from a “vacancy,” but they forfeited this argument by failing to raise it in the District Court. *See Weinstein v. Islamic Republic of Iran*, 831 F.3d 470, 483 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“To preserve an argument on appeal a party must raise it both in district court and before us.”). Regardless, for purposes of delegation under this regulation, a vacancy may be treated as a type of absence. Appellants' reliance on other provisions of the Departmental Manual where the Department uses the term “vacancy” is misplaced, as those provisions deal specifically with succession, not redelegation. *See* 302 DM 1.1. As discussed above, final decision-making authority pursuant to Section 151.12 is a non-exclusive function, so this

is not an issue of a succession, but rather an issue of redelegation. Thus, “absence” can certainly include a “vacancy” in office, particularly when the functions at issue are non-exclusive. Therefore, the Department did not violate any of the provisions by automatically redelegating the AS–IA’s non-exclusive functions and duties to the Principal Deputy.

In any event, any failure to automatically redelegate this non-exclusive function was corrected when the Department issued the Connor Memorandum. The Departmental Manual acknowledges that it can be superseded by any “appropriate authority,” including but expressly not limited to “a Secretary’s order.” J.A. 248 (listing permissible appropriate authority, “e.g., a change in statute, regulation, or Executive order; a Secretary’s Order or a court decision; *etc.*” (emphasis added)). As the Connor Memorandum explained, the Department intended for Principal Deputy Roberts to exercise the nonexclusive functions and duties of the AS–IA, but the succession order incorrectly identified Roberts’s position. So, although “[t]he Department typically uses succession orders to delegate authority,” the Department issued the Connor Memorandum to “confirm [Roberts’s] authority to exercise the functions and duties of the AS–IA that are not required by law or regulation to be performed only by the AS–IA.” J.A. 276. And given that the Departmental Manual permits deviation from the procedures by any appropriate authority, the Connor Memorandum, issued by the Deputy Secretary of the Interior, permissibly redelegated final decision-making authority to Roberts.⁴ Thus, to the extent that the delegation was not

⁴ Appellants also secondarily argue that Deputy Secretary Connor was not properly delegated the authority to redelegate final decision-making authority to Principal Deputy Roberts. But Appellants forfeited this argument by failing to raise it before the District Court. *Weinstein*, 831 F.3d at 483.

automatically made, it was correctly done through the Connor Memorandum.

III.

Appellants also appeal the District Court's grant of summary judgment to the Department on Appellants' Rancheria Act claim. Appellants claim that they do not challenge the court-approved settlement agreement that reestablished federal recognition of Wilton. Instead, Appellants argue that because the Department distributed assets to Wilton members pursuant to the Rancheria Act, Wilton members are no longer entitled to the federal government's services on account of their status as Indians. We reject this argument as specious.

As Appellants are well aware, we have previously recognized that a court-approved settlement can invalidate the effect of the Rancheria Act. In another lawsuit brought by Stand Up, we concluded that a court-approved settlement agreement is sufficient to restore recognition of a tribe *and* to restore Indian status for members of that tribe notwithstanding the Rancheria Act. *Stand Up!*, 879 F.3d at 1184. The settlement agreement, which a federal court approved, stated that Wilton "was not lawfully terminated, and the Rancheria's assets were not distributed, in accordance with the" Rancheria Act. J.A. 901. The court made clear that the Rancheria Act did not apply to Wilton because the Tribe's assets were not distributed pursuant to the law. Pursuant to this agreement, the Department published notice in the Federal Register stating that Wilton and its members were "relieved from the application of section 10(b) of" the Rancheria Act. *Restoration of Wilton Rancheria*, 74 Fed. Reg. 33,468, 33,468 (July 13, 2009). It is therefore irrelevant that some Wilton members may have received assets because those assets were not distributed pursuant to the statute. The Rancheria Act has no force on the Department with regards to the Wilton Rancheria.

As a fallback, Appellants contend that the District Court erred by relying on the Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994 (“List Act”). Pub. L. No. 103–454, 108 Stat. 4791, 4792 (Nov. 2, 1994). Appellants argue that the List Act did not authorize the restoration of congressionally-terminated tribes through court-approved settlements in its substantive provisions, so the Rancheria Act still controls. Appellants are mistaken. While it is true that the District Court relied on the “Findings” section of the List Act, the “Findings” section acknowledges that “Indian tribes presently may be recognized . . . by a decision of a United States court.” *Id.* § 103(3). This finding comports with decades of court-approved settlements reestablishing federal recognition of Indian tribes. *See, e.g., Hardwick v. United States*, No. C-79-1710-SW (N.D. Cal. 1979); *Table Bluff Band of Indians v. Andrus*, 532 F. Supp. 255, 258, 259–61, 265 (N.D. Cal. 1981); *Smith v. United States*, 515 F. Supp. 56, 61–62 (N.D. Cal. 1978); *Duncan v. Andrus*, 517 F. Supp. 1, 5–6 (N.D. Cal. 1977); *see also Stand Up!*, 879 F.3d at 1185 (discussing validity of the *Hardwick* settlement). It is therefore irrelevant that the List Act failed to expressly authorize the recognition of tribes through court decisions because it confirmed that courts could do so. And that is precisely what the court did when it approved the settlement agreement. Therefore, the court-approved settlement agreement recognizing Wilton and invalidating the Rancheria Act’s application to Wilton comports with the List Act.

Because a court-approved settlement agreement reversed the termination of the Wilton Rancheria pursuant to the Rancheria Act, we affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department.

IV.

Finally, Appellants challenge the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to the Department on their NEPA claims. Appellants argue that, at a minimum, the Department should

have prepared either a supplemental EIS or a new EIS after it selected the Elk Grove location as the site for the casino. This contention also has no merit.

Congress enacted NEPA in 1970. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4347. When an agency takes a “major Federal action[,]” NEPA requires the responsible official to prepare a “detailed statement . . . on (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action, (ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided . . . , (iii) alternatives to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses . . . and . . . long-term productivity, and (v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources.” 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C). This “detailed statement” has become known as an EIS.

An EIS goes through two stages: the draft EIS and the final EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9. *Id.* The principal agency—here, the Department of the Interior—prepares the draft EIS in conjunction with cooperating agencies and obtain comments regarding the proposed federal action. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(a). In the draft EIS, the principal agency must “[i]dentify the agency’s preferred alternative . . . , if one or more exists.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e). The final EIS must address all comments and discuss responsive opposing views it did not discuss adequately in the draft statement. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b); *id.* § 1503.4(a). In responding to comments in the final EIS, the agency is permitted to (1) “[m]odify alternatives including the proposed action,” (2) “[d]evelop and evaluate alternatives not previously given serious consideration,” (3) modify or supplement its analyses, (4) make factual corrections, or (5) explain why the comments do not merit further agency response. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a)(1)–(4). The agency must also identify preferred alternatives in the final EIS unless prohibited by law. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e).

Where necessary, an agency must also prepare a supplemental EIS. An agency must prepare a supplemental

EIS if (1) “[t]he agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns,” or (2) “[t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1)(i)–(ii). An agency may also prepare a supplemental EIS if it determines that doing so would further NEPA’s purpose. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(2).

When we review an EIS prepared under NEPA, our “role is ‘simply to ensure that the agency has adequately considered and disclosed the environmental impact of its actions and that its decision is not arbitrary or capricious.’” *Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC*, 373 F.3d 1323, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting *Baltimore Gas & Elec. v. NRDC*, 462 U.S. 87, 97–98 (1983)). We must “ensure that the agency took a ‘hard look’ at the environmental consequences of its decision to go forward with the project.” *Id.* (quoting *City of Olmsted Falls v. FAA*, 292 F.3d 261, 269 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). In determining whether an agency is required to supplement its EIS, we also apply the arbitrary-and-capricious standard. *Marsh v. Oregon Nat. Res. Council*, 490 U.S. 360, 376 (1989).

In *Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council*, the Supreme Court evaluated whether NEPA required an agency to prepare a supplemental EIS after finalizing the EIS. 490 U.S. 360 (1989). The Court concluded that, “the decision whether to prepare a supplemental EIS is similar to the decision whether to prepare an EIS in the first instance.” *Id.* at 374. If the federal action is pending, then the new information that comes to light must be “sufficient to show that the remaining action will affect the quality of the human environment in a significant manner or to a significant extent not already considered” to require a supplemental EIS. *Id.* (internal alteration and quotation omitted). Put simply, courts must apply the rule of reason, which “turns on the value of the new

information to the still pending decisionmaking process.” *Id.* at 374. In turn, we have held that “[t]he overarching question is whether an EIS’s deficiencies are significant enough to undermine informed public comment and informed decisionmaking.” *Mayo v. Reynolds*, 875 F.3d 11, 20 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting *Sierra Club v. FERC*, 867 F.3d 1357, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2017)).

Under this standard, we conclude that the Department was not required to prepare a supplemental or a new EIS when it selected the Elk Grove location. As we have time and again made clear, “a [supplemental EIS] must be prepared only where new information ‘provides a *seriously* different picture of the environmental landscape.’” *Friends of Capital Crescent Trail v. FTA*, 877 F.3d 1051, 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (quoting *Nat’l Comm. for the New River v. FERC*, 373 F.3d 1323, 1330 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). The Department’s identification in the final EIS of a preferred action among the alternatives it had assessed did not result in a serious change in the environmental landscape. Nor does the fact that the Department buttressed its analysis in the final EIS help Stand Up’s argument. To support its argument that new information affecting the environmental analysis came to light, Stand Up points to the hundreds of pages of analysis that the Department included in the appendix of the final EIS, but Stand Up fails to point to anything in these pages that suggests a significant development, thereby requiring supplementation.

Moreover, nothing prohibited the Department from buttressing its analysis between the draft EIS and the final EIS. In the final EIS, the agency must “respond to comments” and “discuss . . . any responsible view which was not adequately addressed in the draft” EIS. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(b); *see also id.* § 1503.4(a) (permitting the agency to respond to comments by “[m]odify[ing] alternatives including the proposed action” and “[s]upplement[ing], improv[ing], or modify[ing] its analyses”

in the final EIS). But this requirement does not, as Stand Up suggests, prohibit the Department from buttressing its initial analysis. And the Seventh Circuit's holding in *Habitat Education Center* does not contradict this proposition. As Stand Up acknowledges, the Seventh Circuit concluded that when "[s]trictly construed," NEPA regulations "permit an agency to issue a final EIS that does no more than incorporate a previously issued draft EIS and respond to comments received." *Habitat Educ. Ctr., Inc. v. U.S. Forest Servs.*, 673 F.3d 518, 527 (7th Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). That does not mean that an agency is prohibited from going further and bolstering its analysis in the final EIS. The agency must only be sure that the new analysis is not based on new information that paints "a seriously different picture" of the impact of the project.⁵

Nor did the Department's decision to select the Elk Grove location fail to properly notify the public of its plans. "Publication of an EIS, both in draft and final form, also serves a larger informational role" and "provides a springboard for public comment." *Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council*, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989). As such, we must review "whether an EIS's deficiencies are significant enough to undermine informed public comment and informed decisionmaking." *Mayo*, 875 F.3d at 20 (quoting *Sierra Club*, 867 F.3d at 1368). But the designation of the Elk Grove site as the preferred alternative did not deprive the public and interested parties of the opportunity to meaningfully comment on or evaluate the proposal. First, the Department listed the

⁵ And this determination is subject to considerable judicial deference. See *Friends of Capital Crescent Trail*, 877 F.3d at 1059 ("If an agency's decision not to prepare a [supplemental EIS] turns on a 'factual dispute the resolution of which implicated substantial agency expertise,' the court defers to the agency's judgment." (quoting *Marsh*, 490 U.S. at 376)).

Elk Grove site as an alternative proposal. J.A. 968, 970. Second, the Department extensively analyzed the Elk Grove site in its draft EIS. J.A. 1191, 1271–1275, 1279–1324, 1329–1338. The Department also published the draft EIS online and made it available in the Galt public library, which is only a few miles away from Elk Grove. J.A. 969. Third, the Department’s inclusion of the Elk Grove site triggered public comment, including by Stand Up and Lynn Wheat, two of the plaintiffs in this litigation. Thus, not only did the Department provide enough information in its draft EIS to allow for public comment on the Elk Grove site, but it actually did lead to public participation, including by Appellants. Therefore, the Department satisfied its public notice requirements and was not required to prepare a supplemental or a new EIS.

Appellants’ remaining arguments are similarly without merit. First, Appellants argue that the Department failed to follow NEPA regulations because it only made the City of Elk Grove a cooperating agency later in the process. But as the regulation that Appellants cite makes clear, the lead agency must only request “the participation of each cooperating agency in the NEPA process *at the earliest possible time.*” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.6 (emphasis added). Moreover, an agency could “request the lead agency to designate it a cooperating agency,” *id.*, which is what the City of Elk Grove did, and the Department granted that request. It was thus not error for the Department to fail to promptly include the City of Elk Grove as a cooperating agency.

Second, Appellants argue that the turnaround time between the close of the final EIS’s comment period and the issuance of the ROD is impermissibly short. Admittedly, the two-day turnaround between the closure of the comment period and the issuance of the ROD is not typical. But Appellants offer no controlling precedent suggesting that the quick turnaround was *per se* impermissible. And as the District Court

recognized, the one case Appellants cite—a district court case from North Carolina—is inapposite. There, the agency acknowledged that it failed to respond to numerous comments and had already reopened the NEPA process. *North Carolina Alliance for Transp. Reform, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.*, 151 F. Supp. 2d 661, 676 (M.D.N.C. 2001). Here, however, Appellants have not claimed that the Department failed to respond to any comments. Thus, while it may have been unusual for the Department to have moved so quickly to issue the ROD, that short turnaround in and of itself is insufficient to invalidate the decision.

V.

Over seven years after the Department began the process of acquiring land in trust on behalf of Wilton, it has maintained its position that Wilton is a federally recognized tribe and that the officials who made the decision properly followed the Department's regulations. In acquiring this land in trust, the Department followed all of its statutory and regulatory obligations to consider the environmental impact of this acquisition. We therefore affirm.

So ordered.

United States Code Annotated

Title 5. Government Organization and Employees (Refs & Annos)

Part III. Employees (Refs & Annos)

Subpart B. Employment and Retention

Chapter 33. Examination, Selection, and Placement (Refs & Annos)

Subchapter III. Details, Vacancies, and Appointments (Refs & Annos)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3345

§ 3345. Acting officer

Effective: July 7, 2004

Currentness

(a) If an officer of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office--

(1) the first assistant to the office of such officer shall perform the functions and duties of the office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of [section 3346](#);

(2) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct a person who serves in an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity subject to the time limitations of [section 3346](#); or

(3) notwithstanding paragraph (1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer or employee of such Executive agency to perform the functions and duties of the vacant office temporarily in an acting capacity, subject to the time limitations of [section 3346](#), if--

(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve of the applicable officer, the officer or employee served in a position in such agency for not less than 90 days; and

(B) the rate of pay for the position described under subparagraph (A) is equal to or greater than the minimum rate of pay payable for a position at GS-15 of the General Schedule.

(b)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), a person may not serve as an acting officer for an office under this section, if--

(A) during the 365-day period preceding the date of the death, resignation, or beginning of inability to serve, such person--

(i) did not serve in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer; or

(ii) served in the position of first assistant to the office of such officer for less than 90 days; and

(B) the President submits a nomination of such person to the Senate for appointment to such office.

(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply to any person if--

(A) such person is serving as the first assistant to the office of an officer described under subsection (a);

(B) the office of such first assistant is an office for which appointment is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; and

(C) the Senate has approved the appointment of such person to such office.

(c)(1) Notwithstanding subsection (a)(1), the President (and only the President) may direct an officer who is nominated by the President for reappointment for an additional term to the same office in an Executive department without a break in service, to continue to serve in that office subject to the time limitations in [section 3346](#), until such time as the Senate has acted to confirm or reject the nomination, notwithstanding adjournment sine die.

(2) For purposes of this section and [sections 3346, 3347, 3348, 3349, 3349a, and 3349d](#), the expiration of a term of office is an inability to perform the functions and duties of such office.

CREDIT(S)

(Added [Pub.L. 105-277](#), Div. C, Title I, § 151(b), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-611; amended [Pub.L. 108-271](#), § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3345, 5 USCA § 3345

Current through PL 117-14 with the exception of PL 116-283. Incorporation of changes from PL 116-283 are in progress. See credits for details.

United States Code Annotated
 Title 5. Government Organization and Employees (Refs & Annos)
 Part III. Employees (Refs & Annos)
 Subpart B. Employment and Retention
 Chapter 33. Examination, Selection, and Placement (Refs & Annos)
 Subchapter III. Details, Vacancies, and Appointments (Refs & Annos)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3346

§ 3346. Time limitation

Currentness

(a) Except in the case of a vacancy caused by sickness, the person serving as an acting officer as described under [section 3345](#) may serve in the office--

(1) for no longer than 210 days beginning on the date the vacancy occurs; or

(2) subject to subsection (b), once a first or second nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate, from the date of such nomination for the period that the nomination is pending in the Senate.

(b)(1) If the first nomination for the office is rejected by the Senate, withdrawn, or returned to the President by the Senate, the person may continue to serve as the acting officer for no more than 210 days after the date of such rejection, withdrawal, or return.

(2) Notwithstanding paragraph (1), if a second nomination for the office is submitted to the Senate after the rejection, withdrawal, or return of the first nomination, the person serving as the acting officer may continue to serve--

(A) until the second nomination is confirmed; or

(B) for no more than 210 days after the second nomination is rejected, withdrawn, or returned.

(c) If a vacancy occurs during an adjournment of the Congress sine die, the 210-day period under subsection (a) shall begin on the date that the Senate first reconvenes.

CREDIT(S)

(Added [Pub.L. 105-277](#), Div. C, Title I, § 151(b), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-612.)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3346, 5 USCA § 3346

Current through PL 117-14 with the exception of PL 116-283. Incorporation of changes from PL 116-283 are in progress. See credits for details.

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United States Code Annotated
 Title 5. Government Organization and Employees (Refs & Annos)
 Part III. Employees (Refs & Annos)
 Subpart B. Employment and Retention
 Chapter 33. Examination, Selection, and Placement (Refs & Annos)
 Subchapter III. Details, Vacancies, and Appointments (Refs & Annos)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3348

§ 3348. Vacant office

Effective: July 7, 2004

[Currentness](#)

(a) In this section--

(1) the term “action” includes any agency action as defined under [section 551\(13\)](#); and

(2) the term “function or duty” means any function or duty of the applicable office that--

(A)(i) is established by statute; and

(ii) is required by statute to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer); or

(B)(i)(I) is established by regulation; and

(II) is required by such regulation to be performed by the applicable officer (and only that officer); and

(ii) includes a function or duty to which clause (i)(I) and (II) applies, and the applicable regulation is in effect at any time during the 180-day period preceding the date on which the vacancy occurs.

(b) Unless an officer or employee is performing the functions and duties in accordance with [sections 3345](#), [3346](#), and [3347](#), if an officer of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) whose appointment to office is required to be made by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, dies, resigns, or is otherwise unable to perform the functions and duties of the office--

(1) the office shall remain vacant; and

(2) in the case of an office other than the office of the head of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office), only the head of such Executive agency may perform any function or duty of such office.

(c) If the last day of any 210-day period under [section 3346](#) is a day on which the Senate is not in session, the second day the Senate is next in session and receiving nominations shall be deemed to be the last day of such period.

(d)(1) An action taken by any person who is not acting under [section 3345](#), [3346](#), or [3347](#), or as provided by subsection (b), in the performance of any function or duty of a vacant office to which this section and [sections 3346](#), [3347](#), [3349](#), [3349a](#), [3349b](#), and [3349c](#) apply shall have no force or effect.

(2) An action that has no force or effect under paragraph (1) may not be ratified.

(e) This section shall not apply to--

(1) the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board;

(2) the General Counsel of the Federal Labor Relations Authority;

(3) any Inspector General appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate;

(4) any Chief Financial Officer appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate; or

(5) an office of an Executive agency (including the Executive Office of the President, and other than the Government Accountability Office) if a statutory provision expressly prohibits the head of the Executive agency from performing the functions and duties of such office.

CREDIT(S)

(Added [Pub.L. 105-277](#), Div. C, Title I, § 151(b), Oct. 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-613; amended [Pub.L. 108-271](#), § 8(b), July 7, 2004, 118 Stat. 814.)

5 U.S.C.A. § 3348, 5 USCA § 3348

Current through PL 117-14 with the exception of PL 116-283. Incorporation of changes from PL 116-283 are in progress. See credits for details.

United States Code Annotated
 Title 25. Indians (Refs & Annos)
 Chapter 45. Protection of Indians and Conservation of Resources (Refs & Annos)

25 U.S.C.A. § 5108

Formerly cited as 25 USCA § 465

§ 5108. Acquisition of lands, water rights or surface rights; appropriation; title to lands; tax exemption

Currentness

The Secretary of the Interior is authorized, in his discretion, to acquire, through purchase, relinquishment, gift, exchange, or assignment, any interest in lands, water rights, or surface rights to lands, within or without existing reservations, including trust or otherwise restricted allotments, whether the allottee be living or deceased, for the purpose of providing land for Indians.

For the acquisition of such lands, interests in lands, water rights, and surface rights, and for expenses incident to such acquisition, there is authorized to be appropriated, out of any funds in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, a sum not to exceed \$2,000,000 in any one fiscal year: *Provided*, That no part of such funds shall be used to acquire additional land outside of the exterior boundaries of Navajo Indian Reservation for the Navajo Indians in Arizona, nor in New Mexico, in the event that legislation to define the exterior boundaries of the Navajo Indian Reservation in New Mexico, and for other purposes, or similar legislation, becomes law.

The unexpended balances of any appropriations made pursuant to this section shall remain available until expended.

Title to any lands or rights acquired pursuant to this Act or the Act of July 28, 1955 (69 Stat. 392), as amended ([25 U.S.C. 608 et seq.](#)) shall be taken in the name of the United States in trust for the Indian tribe or individual Indian for which the land is acquired, and such lands or rights shall be exempt from State and local taxation.

CREDIT(S)

(June 18, 1934, c. 576, § 5, 48 Stat. 985; [Pub.L. 100-581, Title II, § 214](#), Nov. 1, 1988, 102 Stat. 2941.)

25 U.S.C.A. § 5108, 25 USCA § 5108

Current through PL 117-14 with the exception of PL 116-283. Incorporation of changes from PL 116-283 are in progress. See credits for details.

Code of Federal Regulations
Title 25. Indians
Chapter I. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior
Subchapter H. Land and Water
Part 151. Land Acquisitions (Refs & Annos)

25 C.F.R. § 151.12

§ 151.12 Action on requests.

Effective: December 13, 2013

Currentness

- (a) The Secretary shall review each request and may request any additional information or justification deemed necessary to reach a decision.
- (b) The Secretary's decision to approve or deny a request shall be in writing and state the reasons for the decision.
- (c) A decision made by the Secretary, or the Assistant Secretary—Indian Affairs pursuant to delegated authority, is a final agency action under [5 U.S.C. 704](#) upon issuance.
- (1) If the Secretary or Assistant Secretary denies the request, the Assistant Secretary shall promptly provide the applicant with the decision.
 - (2) If the Secretary or Assistant Secretary approves the request, the Assistant Secretary shall:
 - (i) Promptly provide the applicant with the decision;
 - (ii) Promptly publish in the Federal Register a notice of the decision to acquire land in trust under this part; and
 - (iii) Immediately acquire the land in trust under [§ 151.14](#) on or after the date such decision is issued and upon fulfillment of the requirements of [§ 151.13](#) and any other Departmental requirements.
- (d) A decision made by a Bureau of Indian Affairs official pursuant to delegated authority is not a final agency action of the Department under [5 U.S.C. 704](#) until administrative remedies are exhausted under part 2 of this chapter or until the time for filing a notice of appeal has expired and no administrative appeal has been filed.
- (1) If the official denies the request, the official shall promptly provide the applicant with the decision and notification of any right to file an administrative appeal under part 2 of this chapter.

(2) If the official approves the request, the official shall:

(i) Promptly provide the applicant with the decision;

(ii) Promptly provide written notice of the decision and the right, if any, to file an administrative appeal of such decision pursuant to part 2 of this chapter, by mail or personal delivery to:

(A) Interested parties who have made themselves known, in writing, to the official prior to the decision being made; and

(B) The State and local governments having regulatory jurisdiction over the land to be acquired;

(iii) Promptly publish a notice in a newspaper of general circulation serving the affected area of the decision and the right, if any, of interested parties who did not make themselves known, in writing, to the official to file an administrative appeal of the decision under part 2 of this chapter; and

(iv) Immediately acquire the land in trust under § 151.14 upon expiration of the time for filing a notice of appeal or upon exhaustion of administrative remedies under part 2 of this title, and upon the fulfillment of the requirements of § 151.13 and any other Departmental requirements.

(3) The administrative appeal period under part 2 of this chapter begins on:

(i) The date of receipt of written notice by the applicant or interested parties entitled to notice under paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2)(ii) of this section;

(ii) The date of first publication of the notice for unknown interested parties under paragraph (d)(2)(iii) of this section.

(4) Any party who wishes to seek judicial review of an official's decision must first exhaust administrative remedies under 25 CFR part 2.

Credits

[45 FR 62036, Sept. 18, 1980. Redesignated at 60 FR 32879, June 23, 1995, as amended at 61 FR 18083, April 24, 1996; 78 FR 67937, Nov. 13, 2013]

SOURCE: 45 FR 62036, Sept. 18, 1980, unless otherwise noted. Redesignated at 47 FR 13327, March 30, 1982; 66 FR 3458, Jan. 16, 2001; 66 FR 8899, Feb. 5, 2001; 66 FR 10816, Feb. 20, 2001; 66 FR 31976, June 13, 2001, 66 FR 42415, Aug. 13, 2001; 66 FR 56608, Nov. 9, 2001, unless otherwise noted.

AUTHORITY: R.S. 161; [5 U.S.C. 301](#). Interpret or apply 46 Stat. 1106, as amended; 46 Stat. 1471, as amended; 48 Stat. 985, as amended; 49 Stat. 1967, as amended, 53 Stat. 1129; 63 Stat. 605; 69 Stat. 392, as amended; 70 Stat. 290, as amended; 70 Stat. 626; 75 Stat. 505; 77 Stat. 349; 78 Stat. 389; 78 Stat. 747; 82 Stat. 174, as amended, 82 Stat. 884; 84 Stat. 120; 84 Stat. 1874; 86 Stat. 216; 86 Stat. 530; 86 Stat. 744; 88 Stat. 78; 88 Stat. 81; 88 Stat. 1716; 88 Stat. 2203; 88 Stat. 2207; [25 U.S.C. 2, 9, 409a, 450h, 451, 464, 465, 487, 488, 489, 501, 502, 573, 574, 576, 608, 608a, 610, 610a, 622, 624, 640d-10, 1466, 1495](#), and other authorizing acts.

Current through May 27, 2021; 86 FR 28500.

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CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES AND AMICI

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 28(a), the following is a statement of the parties and amici:

Parties and Amici

Stand Up For California!, Patty Johnson, Joe Teixeira, and Lynn Wheat (collectively, “Stand Up”) were plaintiffs in the district court and are appellants in 19-5285.

The United States Department of the Interior, David Bernhardt, in his official capacity as Secretary of the Interior, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and Tara M. Sweeney, in her official capacity as Assistant Secretary–Indian Affairs, were defendants in the district court and appellees in 19-5285.

Wilton Rancheria, California, appeared as an intervenor-defendant in the district court and is an intervenor-appellee in this Court.

There were no amici in the district court, and no amici have thus far sought to participate in this Court.

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

1. I hereby certify that this motion complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P. 27(d)(2)(A) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. As measured by the word-processing system used to prepare this motion, the motion contains 3900 words.

2. This document complies with the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6), because it has been prepared in a 14 point proportionally spaced roman-style typeface (Times New Roman).

Dated: June 1, 2021

/s/ Jennifer A. MacLean

Jennifer A. MacLean

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 1, 2021, I electronically filed the foregoing with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that all participants in the case are registered CM/ECF users and that service will be accomplished by the CM/ECF system.

Dated: June 1, 2021

/s/ Jennifer A. MacLean

Jennifer A. MacLean